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The Problem of Problem-Solving
Courts
Erin R. Collins*
The creation of a specialized, “problem-solving” court is a ubiquitous
response to the issues that plague our criminal legal system. The courts
promise to address the factors believed to lead to repeated interactions with
the system, such as addiction or mental illness, thereby reducing recidivism
and saving money. And they do so effectively — at least according to their
many proponents, who celebrate them as an example of a successful
“evidence-based,” data-driven reform. But the actual data on their efficacy
is underwhelming, inconclusive, or altogether lacking. So why do they
persist?
This Article seeks to answer that question by scrutinizing the role of
judges in creating and sustaining the problem-solving court movement. It
contends problem-solving courts do effectively address a problem — it is
just not the one we think. It argues that these courts revive a sense of purpose
and authority for judges in an era marked by diminishing judicial power.
Moreover, it demonstrates that the courts have developed and proliferated
relatively free from objective oversight. Together, these new insights help
explain why the problem-solving court model endures. They also reveal a
new problem with the model itself — its entrenchment creates resistance to
alternatives that might truly reform or transform the system.
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INTRODUCTION
A common response to the persistent problem of the overburdened
criminal court system is to create a specialized, or “problem-solving,”1
court to focus on a particular type of offense or offender. In the thirty
years since the first modern problem-solving court2 — the drug court
— opened its doors, the problem-solving court movement has gained
tremendous momentum. There are now more than 4,000 specialized
courts throughout the country dedicated to an ever-expanding roster of
issues, which currently includes mental health courts, veterans courts,
human trafficking courts, re-entry courts, and opioid intervention
courts, along with many others.3 And while this reform method
emerged as a state-court innovation, there is growing interest in
expanding its presence in the federal arena. For example, the President’s
Commission on Combatting Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis
recommended in 2017 that every federal district court establish a drug
court and that the Department of Justice “urge states to establish drug

1 The term “problem-solving” court is itself problematic. See Erin R. Collins, Status
Courts, 105 GEO. L.J. 1481, 1483 n.1 (2017) [hereinafter Status Courts] (summarizing
critiques). However, I will use that term in this Article, as it is the term that is most
commonly used in the relevant literature. I will also interchangeably use the term
“specialized” or “specialty” court.
2 Some scholars have suggested juvenile courts were the first “problem-solving”
court. See id. at 1496; see, e.g., Jane M. Spinak, Romancing the Court, 46 FAM. CT.
REV. 258, 259 (2008) (identifying family court as the “paradigmatic problem-solving
court”); Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts,
30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1056 (2003) (identifying juvenile court as “the forerunner
of . . . specialized [problem-solving] courts”). See generally Collins, Status Courts, supra
note 1, at 1520 (discussing connection between juvenile courts and problem-solving
courts).
3 As of January 2020, there were more than 3,000 drug courts. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, DRUG COURTS 1 (2020), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/238527.pdf
[https://perma.cc/67XN-KNSK]. As of December 31, 2014, there were 1,311 problemsolving courts other than drug courts. See DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, CAROLYN D. HARDIN &
CARSON L. FOX, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL
REPORT ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 5657 (2016), https://www.ndci.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Painting-the-CurrentPicture-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7V6L-NTMA]; Problem-Solving Courts, NAT’L INST.
JUST. (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/pages/specialized-courts.aspx
[https://perma.cc/DM2T-6AZ5] (listing types of courts). And Texas recently created the
first public safety employee’s court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 129.003 (2020)
(authorizing the creation of public safety employees’ treatment court programs).
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courts in every county.”4 And President Biden has expressed his support
for drug courts.5
A survey of problem-solving court literature leaves little doubt as to
why this reform has become so popular.6 Problem-solving courts
purport to harness proven, “evidence-based” practices to address the
underlying problems that lead to repeated interactions with the criminal
justice system.7 By doing so, they promise to reduce recidivism and save
money.8 What’s more, these laudatory claims are backed with data.9
4 CHRIS CHRISTIE, CHARLIE BAKER, ROY COOPER, PATRICK J. KENNEDY, BERTHA MADRAS
& PAM BONDI, THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION AND THE
OPIOID CRISIS 10 (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/
files/images/Final_Report_Draft_11-1-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/MF4T-M92H]. And
the First Step Act was criticized for not including support for drug courts and other
problem-solving courts. See Kahryn Riley, The FIRST STEP Act Is Good; Now States
(May
20,
2018,
9:00
AM
EDT),
Should
Step
Up,
HILL
https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/388120-the-first-step-act-is-good-nowstates-should-step-up [https://perma.cc/ZC35-VWVH].
5 Dan Adams, Biden Embraces Drug Courts, But Do They Actually Work? BOSTON
GLOBE (Nov. 2, 2020, 1:17 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/11/02/marijuana/
biden-embraces-drug-courts-do-they-actually-work/ [https://perma.cc/7AER-4EHQ].
6 See generally KERWIN KAYE, ENFORCING FREEDOM: DRUG COURTS, THERAPEUTIC
COMMUNITIES, AND THE INTIMACIES OF THE STATE 7 (2020) (describing widespread,
bipartisan support for drug courts).
7 See, e.g., Samantha Harvell, Jeremy Welsh-Loveman, Hanna Love, Julia Durnan,
Josh Eisenstat, Laura Golian, Eddir Mohr, Elizabeth Pelletier, Julie Samuels, Chelsea
Thomson, Margaret Ulle & Nancy La Vigne, Reforming Sentencing and Corrections
Policy: The Experience of Justice Reinvestment Initiative States, Executive Summary, 29
FED. SENT’G REP. 175, 177 (2016) (identifying problem-solving courts an “evidencebased” practice); Scott, Lewis Introduce Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform Legislation,
CONGRESSMAN BOBBY SCOTT (Nov. 7, 2017), https://bobbyscott.house.gov/media-center/
press-releases/scott-lewis-introduce-bipartisan-criminal-justice-reform-legislation
[https://perma.cc/Q8NY-GJ2S] (describing drug courts as an “evidence-based” reform).
Nebraska, for example, requires all problem-solving courts to “utilize evidence-based
practices as identified by applicable scientific research and literature” and to “adhere to
best practice standards.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 6-1208 (2020).
8 See, e.g., MARLOWE ET AL., supra note 3, at 15; Richard Boldt & Jana
Singer, Juristocracy in the Trenches: Problem-Solving Judges and Therapeutic Jurisprudence
in Drug Treatment Courts and Unified Family Courts, 65 MD. L. REV. 82, 85 (2006)
(noting that the “architects and supporters” of drug courts have claimed that they are
“a means of reducing the high expenditure of resources by other criminal justice
agencies necessitated by the lengthy prison sentences that many drug offenders receive”
and “a useful way to insure that the revolving door of addiction and criminality is
interrupted through the use of effective therapeutic approaches to drug use disorders”).
9 See MARLOWE ET AL., supra note 3, at 14 (“More than 25 years of exhaustive
scientific research . . . has proven that adult drug courts are effective and cost-effective
. . . .”); Mitchell B. Mackinem & Paul Higgins, Adult Drug Courts: A Hope Realized?, in
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 33, 41 (Paul
Higgins & Mitchell B. Mackinem eds., 2009) (“The body of drug court research
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And they are even enshrined in legislation and reiterated in judicial
opinions. Nebraska, for example, has declared that “problem-solving
courts, including drug, veterans, mental health, driving under the
influence, reentry, and other problem-solving courts, are effective in
reducing recidivism . . . .”10 In short: problem-solving courts work.11
However, the empirical landscape of problem-solving court efficacy
is more complicated than most proponents acknowledge.12 What is
perhaps the most striking about problem-solving courts is how little we
actually know about their impact. With the exception of drug courts,
which have been the subject of great empirical scrutiny,13 other types of
specialized courts have not been rigorously assessed.14 And the data
supports one fundamental conclusion: drug court reduces recidivism.”); cf. NAT’L DRUG
COURT INST., THE DRUG COURT JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK 29 (Douglas B. Marlowe & William
G. Meyer eds., 2011), https://www.ndci.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/14146_NDCI_
Benchbook_v6.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KLU-AATT] (“No drug court program is a
success if that success cannot be demonstrated through clear, convincing evidence.”).
10 NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-1301 (2020). Similarly, the Idaho Drug and Mental Health
Court Act states that drug courts “have proven effective . . . in reducing the incidence
of drug use, drug addiction, and crimes committed as a result of drug use and drug
addiction,” and that mental health courts “have provided a cost-effective approach to
addressing the mental health needs of offenders, reducing recidivism, providing
community protection, easing the caseload of the courts, and alleviating the problem of
increasing prison, jail and detention populations.” IDAHO CODE § 19-5602 (2), (4)
(2020). See generally United States v. Dokmeci, No. 13-CR-00455, 2016 WL 915185, at
*6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2016) (“And data from [state drug court] programs prove they
work.”).
11 See MARLOWE ET AL., supra note 3, at 14 (declaring “[t]he [v]erdict [i]s [i]n:
[d]rug [c]ourts [w]ork”).
12 See Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Rethinking Federal Diversion: The Rise of
Specialized Criminal Courts, 22 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 47, 84-87 (2017) (summarizing
studies).
13 See 1 NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF’LS, ADULT DRUG COURT BEST PRACTICE
STANDARDS, at vi (2013), https://www.nadcp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/AdultDrug-Court-Best-Practice-Standards-Volume-I-Text-Revision-December-2018-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RUR9-8VLR] (“In the 24 years since the first Drug Court was founded
in Miami/Dade County, Florida, more research has been published on the effects of
Drug Court than on virtually all other criminal justice programs combined.”).
14 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE-TO-INCARCERATION
COURT PROGRAMS 13 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-publications/2017/20170928_alternatives.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QA3X-DHKF] (noting lack of empirically sound studies of the efficacy of mental health
or veterans courts); see MARLOWE ET AL., supra note 3, at 26 (noting that research on the
efficacy of Veteran’s Courts is “in its infancy and is based largely on anecdotal reports,
pre/post studies lacking comparison groups, or studies that included potentially biased
comparison groups”); Julie Marie Baldwin & Erika J. Brooke, Pausing in the Wake of
Rapid Adoption: A Call to Critically Examine the Veterans Treatment Court Concept, 58 J.
OFFENDER REHABILITATION 1, 18 (2019) (“[T]here is a dearth of evaluation research on
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regarding drug courts does not actually tell the unmitigated success
story their proponents recite. For example, a recent analysis of drug
court evaluations found “mixed” results.15 Some studies showed drug
courts reduced recidivism (at “modest” levels), while others indicated
they had no impact on recidivism, and one even found they increased
recidivism rates.16 And a recent Federal Judicial Center study found that
participation in the federal re-entry courts (which are essentially postincarceration drug courts) produced no statistically significant difference
in recidivism rates for court participants.17 It concluded that the reentry court model “cannot be said to be a cost-effective method for
reducing revocation and recidivism.”18
Thus, much of the available data about problem-solving court
performance undermines or at least tempers the unqualified claims that
this is an effective and efficient reform mechanism. Nevertheless, the
problem-solving court movement not only persists, but also appears to
be gaining momentum.19 While this reform has been spreading across
the country for thirty years, much of the growth has occurred over the

the efficacy, effectiveness, and even cost of the [veterans court] concept and its
implementation.”); Richard C. Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts, in 3 ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE,
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 273, 284 (Erik Luna ed.,
2017), https://law.asu.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/academy_for_justice/Reforming-CriminalJustice_Vol_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VGD-YGSU] [hereinafter Problem-Solving Courts,
in 3 ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE] (noting that “evidence on mental-health courts is incomplete
and paints a more complex picture” than drug court evidence).
15 See Edward J. Latessa & Angela K. Reitler, What Works in Reducing Recidivism and
How Does It Relate to Drug Courts?, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 757, 767 (2015).
16 See id. at 767-79.
17 DAVID RAUMA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EVALUATION OF A FEDERAL REENTRY PROGRAM
MODEL 1-3 (2016). The study defined recidivism as “felony and misdemeanor arrests
for new offenses” within twenty-four and thirty months of program completion. Id. at
38. Other interesting findings include that approximately 60% of eligible participants
declined the opportunity to participate.
18 Id.
19 For example, Indiana’s Chief Justice praised the state for opening its 100th
problem-solving court in her 2020 State of the Judiciary, and predicted that 2020 “will
see the advent of many more” problem-solving courts. Katie Stancombe, Rush Highlights
Problem-Solving Courts, Pretrial Reform in 2020 State of the Judiciary, IND. LAW. (Jan. 15,
2020), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/rush-highlights-problem-solving-courtspretrial-reform-in-2020-state-of-the-judiciary [https://perma.cc/D526-SEEQ]. Ohio’s
Chief Justice similarly anticipates her state will increase its number of drug courts over
the next year. See Maureen O’Connor, Opinion, Put Welfare of the Addicted First with
Treatment and Consequences. HB 1 Does That, CLEVELAND (Dec. 7, 2019),
https://www.cleveland.com/opinion/2019/12/put-welfare-of-the-addicted-first-withtreatment-and-consequences-hb-1-does-that-maureen-oconnor.html [https://perma.cc/
GC4S-VUPX].
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last decade. For example, as of 2012, there were approximately 1,300
drug courts nationwide, and more than 3,400 by 2020.20
What explains this disjuncture between the actual data on problemsolving court performance and the sustained — and growing —
enthusiasm for this purportedly data-driven practice? Part of the
answer, which has been explored in existing scholarly analyses,
undoubtedly lies in how the rhetoric (if not the practice) of problemsolving justice aligns with the growing consensus that we should use
data-driven practices to ration scarce carceral resources.21 Indeed,
problem-solving courts embody the current “neorehabilitative” impulse
in criminal justice reform, which seeks to selectively revive the
rehabilitative ideal for those individuals deemed sufficiently low-risk
for, or deserving of, non-carceral punishment without sacrificing
traditional principles of accountability or judicial authority.22
This Article identifies another answer to this question by looking
beyond the rhetoric and examining the courts themselves. Specifically,
it focuses on the role of the problem-solving court judges in creating
and sustaining this reform movement. It argues that problem-solving
courts persist in part because they revive a sense of purpose and
authority for judges in an era marked by diminishing judicial power.23
In other words, one factor that explains the growth of problem-solving
courts is their positive impact on judges. Indeed, while much of the data
about problem-solving court efficacy is ambiguous or inconsistent, one
metric of success seems clear: judges like them.24 Problem-solving court
judges describe presiding over these courts as the most rewarding and
20 See SUZANNE M. STRONG, RAMONA R. RANTALA & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 249803, CENSUS OF PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS, 2012, at 1 (2016);
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 3.
21 See, e.g., Collins, Status Courts, supra note 1, at 1499 (describing how problemsolving courts are portrayed as way to “effectively direct scarce resources to recurring
systemic issues”); Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 595,
637 (2016) [hereinafter The Drug Court Paradigm] (identifying budgetary concerns and
“evidence of effectiveness and efficiency” as factors that contributed to the rise of “smart
on crime” reforms).
22 See Collins, Status Courts, supra note 1, at 1520. As Eric Miller has noted in the
context of drug courts, they can “appear as all things to all people.” Eric J.
Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial
Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1503 (2004).
23 See generally KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998) (describing the rise of the “fear of judging”).
Other scholars have made a similar observation in passing. See Boldt & Singer, supra
note 8, at 84. However, this Article is the first to develop and focus on this observation,
and identify the questions it raises as to the propriety of this reform mechanism.
24 See infra Part I.B.
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satisfying experiences of their careers.25 And they report higher job
satisfaction than judges in traditional court assignments and are more
likely to report that their court assignment has a “positive emotional
effect” on them.26
This insight helps resolve the puzzle posed above. If a primary
impetus for the rise of problem-solving courts is judicial satisfaction,
whether the courts actually reduce recidivism or save money is of no
moment. In other words, problem-solving courts do effectively solve a
problem — it is just not the problem we think.
That judges reap professional and personal benefits from presiding
over a problem-solving court is not, on its own, troubling. But it
becomes so in light of another dynamic this Article uncovers —
problem-solving courts are largely unregulated institutions. Despite the
voluminous scholarly interest in problem-solving courts, scant
attention has been paid to how or whether the courts are regulated.27
This Article fills that gap, demonstrating that the judges themselves
often wield tremendous power over these courts, deciding whether they
will open in the first place and how they will operate.
Thus, those who find much satisfaction in this court process also play
a central role in creating and sustaining these institutions. As a result,
they have become self-reinforcing institutions that are protected from
meaningful external scrutiny.28 Examining problem-solving courts
from this new perspective raises new questions and concerns about
their propriety. First, it casts doubt on what we know — or think we
25 See infra Part II.B.; see also James L. Nolan, Therapeutic Adjudication, 39 SOCIETY
29, 37 (2002) [hereinafter Therapeutic Adjudication] (quoting a drug court judge saying
every drug court judge he has talked to has said drug court is the “most satisfying thing”
they have done in their career); Michael Newman, A Federal Judge Reflects on Reentry
Court, FED. LAW., Dec. 2015, at 40, 41, https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/12/Reentry-pdf-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UHU-MTFL] (describing his
experience sitting on a reentry court as “one of the more rewarding things I have done
as a federal judge”).
26 Deborah Chase & Peggy Fulton Hora, The Best Seat in the House: The Court
Assignment and Judicial Satisfaction, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 209, 209 (2009).
27 See Michael C. Pollack, Courts Beyond Judging, 2021 BYU L. Rev. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 30) (on file with author) (noting that there “is in fact little in the
way of a sustained or empirical account of the process by which [problem-solving]
courts come into being or, critically, of who initiates that process”).
28 A recent study of the governance structure of prosecutor-led diversion programs
revealed a similar phenomenon — those who design and operate the programs (namely,
prosecutors) exercise largely unbridled and unchecked discretion. See Kay L. Levine &
Ronald F. Wright, Models of Prosecutor-Led Diversion Programs in the United States and
Beyond, ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 15),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3601930, [https://perma.cc/6SKTPD4F] (describing the “weak accountability of prosecutor-led diversion”).
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know — about the impact of this reform method, as the judges
themselves often influence the metrics of success. Second, it reveals a
new cause for concern: the judicial investment in, and control over,
problem-solving courts can create resistance to new approaches to
reforming or transforming the system.29 This resistance has taken many
forms. For example, some drug court judges have lobbied against
statutory reforms that would reduce penalties for low-level drug
offenses or create diversion opportunities that do not involve drug court
participation.30 And resistance also occurs more implicitly, through
problem-solving court judges’ unwillingness to incorporate new
knowledge about both the nature of the purported “problem” to be
solved and the most effective solutions.31
Problem-solving courts were one of the early reforms of this datadriven era of criminal justice reform. One scholar has even suggested
that the drug court model has become a “paradigm” for current
sentencing reform efforts.32 Thus, this Article — which suggests that
problem-solving courts are not driven by actual data and may in fact
resist incorporating new scientific knowledge — raises questions and
identifies implications for other purportedly evidence-based, datadriven reforms.33
The Article begins in Part I by recounting, and then correcting, the
traditional origin story of the problem-solving court movement. Part II
tells a different origin story, one that focuses on changes to the role and
authority of criminal court judges that made the nascent problemsolving court model attractive to these judges. Drawing on theories of
bureaucratic behavior, it then identifies structural and individual
factors that encourage the growth of the problem-solving courts,
regardless of their external efficacy. Finally, it demonstrates that
29 Allegra McLeod explains the difference between reformist and transformative
approaches as follows: “[w]hereas reformist efforts to redress extreme abuse or
dysfunction in the criminal process without further destabilizing existing legal and
social systems . . . abolitionist measures recognize justice as attainable only through a
more thorough transformation of our political, social, and economic lives.” Allegra M.
McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1616 (2019).
30 See infra Part III.B.2; see also KAYE, supra note 6, at 45-46 (discussing opposition
by the National Association of Drug Court Professionals to California Proposition 5).
31 See infra Part III.B.1.
32 Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, supra note 21, at 595. For analyses of the
promise and peril of other evidence-based reforms, see generally Cecelia Klingele, The
Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537 (2015);
Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 803 (2014).
33 See Erin R. Collins, Against the Evidence-Based Paradigm (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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problem-solving courts are largely unregulated institutions, leaving
oversight to the local courts — and in particular the judges who initiate
and preside over them. The Article concludes in Part III by identifying
how these new insights uncover new concerns for the proliferation of
this criminal justice reform model. Specifically, it contends that these
courts have become essentially self-reinforcing institutions. As a result,
the deep judicial investment in, and influence over, problem-solving
courts creates resistance to policies and programs that may actually
reform or transform the system.
I.

PROBLEMATIZING PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS

This Part briefly describes problem-solving courts and recites the
traditional account of their origins and success. It then complicates this
standard narrative by correcting one of its key tenets — that these
courts are based on empirically proven methods. This observation raises
a question: if the courts are not achieving their stated purpose, what
explains their continued growth?
A. Recounting the Traditional Origin Story
Problem-solving courts are specialized criminal or quasi-criminal
courts that often offer treatment and enhanced supervision in addition
to or in lieu of incarceration.34 The prototypical problem-solving court
— the drug court — opened thirty years ago and has served as a model
for courts dedicated to a range of issues. The various courts are “defined
by their diversity”; they differ in topic, methodology, and organizing
principle.35 But they generally fall into three categories. Treatment
courts, such as mental health courts, drug courts, and homelessness
courts, attempt to address an issue that is believed to be criminogenic.36
Accountability courts, such as domestic violence courts and community
courts, stress the need to enhance accountability for certain kinds of
34 See Collins, Status Courts, supra note 1, at 1485-86; see also Michael C. Dorf &
Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1508 (2003) (defining problem-solving courts as “simply
specialized courts that develop expertise with particular problems”). For an overview
of how one type of problem-solving court — veterans court — operates, see Robert T.
Russell, Veterans Treatment Courts Developing Throughout the Nation, in FUTURE TRENDS
IN STATE COURTS: 2009, at 130, 131-32 (Carol R. Flango et al. eds., 2009),
https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ctadmin/id/1486/ [https://perma.cc/
MCD6-LRHZ] [hereinafter Throughout the Nation].
35 Collins, Status Courts, supra note 1, at 1486. See generally id. at 1485-98 (offering
a typology of problem-solving courts).
36 Id. at 1488-89 (describing “treatment courts”).
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offenses.37 And status courts, such as veterans courts and girls courts,
aim to address the purportedly “unique needs” of certain populations.38
But despite this diversity, the universe of problem-solving courts is
united by a common claim, namely, that these courts solve a problem
that would otherwise lead to repeated interaction with the criminal legal
system.39
Much problem-solving court literature recites a common account of
the origins of these specialized courts. A pioneering judge notices a
problem with the way the criminal justice system treats a certain kind
of offense or offender and creates a specialized court to address that
problem.40 For example, as Judge Robert T. Russell, reflecting on the
impetus behind his decision to open the nation’s first veterans court,
explained, “As presiding Judge over Buffalo’s Drug Treatment and
Mental Health Treatment courts, I noticed that many of the participants
on my docket had something in common — they were veterans.”41
From this observation, Judge Russell extrapolated that veterans are a
“niche population with unique needs” that were not being met in the
traditional criminal justice system, so he created a new court.42
This account is recited anew seemingly every time a jurisdiction
opens a new specialty court.43 In May 2018, the Chief Judge Daniel
Guierin of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit in DuPage County, Illinois
reflected on his recent decision to open a court for first-time opioid
offenders: “It became apparent to me there was a significant and
growing gap in how drug offenders are treated,” Guerin said.44 “The
37

Id. at 1489-91 (describing “accountability courts”).
Id. at 1491-98 (describing “status courts”).
39 See id. at 1486; E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L.
REV. 519, 521-22 (2012) (“[T]he primary goal of most mental health courts is to reduce
recidivism.”).
40 See, e.g., John Adams, Jaye Hobart & Mark Rosenberg, The Illinois Veterans
Treatment Court Mandate: From Concept to Success, SIMON REV., Oct. 2016, at 1, 3 (“[T]he
path forward for these treatment courts had been fairly similar from Alaska to New
York: a judge or other passionate court professional would identify a set of problems
common to veterans in the criminal justice system, and would then work with treatment
professionals to formulate appropriate strategies to help rehabilitate them.”).
41 Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Court: A Proactive Approach, 35 NEW ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 357, 363 (2009) [hereinafter A Proactive Approach].
42 See id.
43 See, e.g., Sarah Lustbader, Are Problem-Solving Courts Impeding Progress?, APPEAL
(Jan. 7, 2020), https://theappeal.org/are-problem-solving-courts-impeding-progress/
[https://perma.cc/E8AC-2KHJ] (describing this phenomenon in the context of New
York trafficking courts).
44 Gary Gibula, Specialty Court for First-Time Opioid Offenders Planned in DuPage as
‘Crisis Reaches Beyond What Many People Realize,’ CHI. TRIB. (May 22, 2018, 4:25 PM),
38
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problem that I saw was that first offenders, predominantly young users
with no criminal history, were coming into the system and not being
funneled into a specific courtroom. I think it’s extremely important to
address this.”45 Another recent news account tells the story of the first
Treatment Court in Mercer County, Pennsylvania. It begins with Judge
John Reed noticing an “ugly pattern”: many of the cases that came
before him involved substance abuse. He then successfully pushed for
the County to open its first treatment court in January 2019.46
So told, the story of the modern problem-solving court movement is
the story of innovative trial judges who draw on their real-world
observations to push back against the inefficiencies of tough criminal
justice enforcement policies.47 This traditional account positions
specialized courts as a response to problems caused by systemic issues
external to the judicial process.48 Commentators frame the “problem”
that such courts emerged to address in a variety of ways. Many focus on
the conditions or issues with the individual offender believed to
contribute to their criminal behavior, such as addiction — to controlled
substances, alcohol, or gambling, for example — or mental illness.49
Others point to the societal failures that funnel individuals with shared
individual “problems” into the criminal justice system, such as the
https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/naperville-sun/ct-nvs-dupage-opioid-taskforce-funding-st-0523-story.html [https://perma.cc/7ES6-ABM4].
45 Id.
46 Michael Roknick, County to Form Treatment Court, HERALD (Nov. 4, 2018),
https://www.sharonherald.com/news/local_news/county-to-form-treatment-court/
article_39916d6c-dfd7-11e8-9a0d-8fdbfa5f01d6.html [https://perma.cc/SQ6T-6MAQ].
Interestingly, Judge Reed had started the County’s first Veterans Court in 2014. Id.
47 See GREG BERMAN, Judicial Innovation in Action: The Rise of Problem-Solving Courts,
in REDUCING CRIME, REDUCING INCARCERATION: ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE INNOVATION
51, 54-55 (2014) [hereinafter Judicial Innovation in Action]; see also JAMES L. NOLAN, JR.,
REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 44 (2001) [hereinafter
REINVENTING JUSTICE] (noting that a “common refrain” from drug court officials is:
“What we were doing before simply was not working”).
48 See NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 44 (“[A]dvocates of drug court
often speak of the structural pressures that they believe gave birth to the movement”).
49 JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., LEGAL ACCENTS, LEGAL BORROWING: THE INTERNATIONAL
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT MOVEMENT 10 (2009) [hereinafter LEGAL ACCENTS] (“[T]he
problems to which people generally refer when speaking of problem-solving courts are
those of the individual offenders . . . .”); see, e.g., Patricia A. Griffin & David DeMatteo,
Mental Health Courts: Cautious Optimism, in PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?, supra note 9, at 91, 92-93 (claiming that the development of
mental health courts was “[o]ne response of the criminal justice system to [the] bleak
situation” caused by the lack of treatment and management of offenders with mental
health needs); see Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 9, at 33 (identifying “problem drug
use” as the reason drug courts emerged).
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breakdown of institutions that previously had provided support for
issues such as substance abuse and mental illness.50 And most
emphasize the changes in criminal justice enforcement policies that
funneled more cases into the system, thus increasing caseloads and
pressure to process cases quickly.51 As a result, the increasingly
overburdened criminal justice system failed to address the underlying
conditions believed to cause criminal behavior (e.g., substance
addiction or mental health issues), allowed certain types of criminal
behavior to slip through the cracks (e.g., domestic violence offenses or
low-level quality of life offenses), or failed to address certain offenders
with the dignity they deserved (e.g., veterans).52 Thus, despite the
diversity of problem-solving courts, they “all seek to use the authority
of courts to address the underlying problems of individual litigants, the
structural problems of the justice system, and the social problems of
communities.”53
Crucially, the traditional account depicts the progression of problemsolving court development as largely linear: a particular court form
emerges, is effective, and then spreads to other jurisdictions. They are
routinely justified as an “evidence-based” approach to criminal justice

50 BERMAN, Judicial Innovation in Action, supra note 47, at 54 (identifying “social and
historical forces” that contributed to the rise of problem-solving courts, such as
programs that “traditionally addressed problems like addiction, mental illness, and
domestic violence”).
51 See id. (identifying the “most important forces” that led to the rise of problemsolving courts as “rising caseloads and increasing frustration . . . with the standard
approach to case processing and case outcomes in state courts”); NOLAN, REINVENTING
JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 45 (“[T]he institutional realities (e.g., limited prison space,
high rearrest rate among drug offenders, overcrowded court calendars) put pressure on
judges to come up with other plans for handling this group of offenders.”). As Candace
McCoy has recounted, these “essentially utilitarian, cost-conscious rationales”
concerning the excessive demands on court resources were central to the development
of the first drug courts. Candace McCoy, The Politics of Problem-Solving: An Overview of
the Origins and Development of Therapeutic Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513, 1518
(2003). As the courts evolved, they took on a more “offender-centered and therapeutic”
justification. Id.
52 See Collins, Status Courts, supra note 1, at 1485-97 (typologizing problem-solving
courts).
53 Greg Berman, What Is a Traditional Judge, Anyway?, 84 JUDICATURE 78, 78 (2000).
A panel of judges asked to identify the conditions that “created problem-solving courts”
pointed, alternatively, to the “huge” number of cases in the system, the prevalence of
particular types of cases (e.g., those involving substance abuse or domestic violence),
the sense that the same people were being “recycle[ed] . . . through the system,” and
“the abject failure of other branches of government,” and the failure to provide mental
health services to those in need. See id. at 80.
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reform, one that uses data and best practices to refine and enhance
criminal justice interventions.54
The traditional account only makes sense if these courts effectively
address the systemic issues that prompted their creation. Indeed, claims
of increased efficacy and efficiency are central to the legitimization of
the problem-solving court movement.55 That they produce more
efficient results than their traditional counterparts is one of the
“foundational premises on which problem-solving courts rest . . . .”56
They are, by definition, consequentialist institutions, justified by their
dedication to improving outcomes.57 Proponents celebrate these
endeavors for being purely pragmatic, guided only by a “what works”
ethos.58 As one problem-solving court judge reflected, her dedication to
this method flows more from “practical than philosophical
considerations”; “if it works, do it.”59
B. Correcting the Traditional Origin Story
The traditional account, while compelling, does not withstand
scrutiny in at least one key respect: these courts have not developed
methodically, based on the proven success of their predecessors. Rather,
the courts spread quickly, before there is time for meaningful reflection
let alone rigorous empirical scrutiny, as to whether they achieve their
aims. For example, by 1998 at least 161 adult drug treatment courts had
been established, and 159 were in the works.60 Yet, at that point, “no

54

See infra note 64 (citing sources).
See Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts, in 3 ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 278
(“The driving force behind the problem-solving courts movement from its inception
has been its express commitment to effectiveness.”).
56 Eric Lane, Due Process and Problem-Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955, 956
(2003).
57 For example, Judith Kaye, former Chief Judge of the New York State Court of
Appeals, identified the belief “that outcomes — not just process and precedents —
matter” as a uniting tenet of problem-solving courts. Judith S. Kaye, Making the Case for
Hands-On Courts, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 11, 2000), https://www.unl.edu/eskridge/
handson.cj211.htm [https://perma.cc/2W32-ERVL]; see also NOLAN, REINVENTING
JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 106 (“[U]tilitarianism is a fundamental justificatory principle
legitimating the expansion of the drug court movement.”); Boldt, Problem-Solving
Courts, in 3 ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 278 (“The driving force behind the
problem-solving courts movement from its inception has been its express commitment
to effectiveness.”).
58 NOLAN, LEGAL ACCENTS, supra note 49, at 12.
59 Id.
60 Developments in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration for Drug-Abusing Offenders, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1898, 1916 (1998).
55
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one [had] yet systematically reviewed their efficacy.”61 This
phenomenon was repeated with veterans courts. Judge Russell opened
the first veterans court in 2008, and by 2009 seven more veterans courts
had opened in other jurisdictions, with more in the planning stages.62
Thus, within a year — which is hardly sufficient time to come to any
founded conclusions as to whether this court improved outcomes for
defendants, as it claimed — the veterans court model had spread across
the country. A decade later, the number has now grown to more than
450, despite the continued dearth of research demonstrating their
efficacy.63
This dynamic, whereby a new court form spreads before it is tested
or even critically examined, is currently playing out in the context of
one of the newest specialized court forms: opioid intervention courts. A
judge in Buffalo, New York opened the first such court in 2016.64 By
January 2018, a judge in New York City had opened a similar court,65
and within months a judge in DuPage County, Illinois had declared his
intent to do the same.66 As of July 2019, opioid intervention courts had
opened in at least five states.67
Thus, while the courts are retrospectively data-justified, they are not
“data-driven” in the sense that they are not actually built upon data
proving they effectively fulfill their mission. Instead, they seem to be
fueled — especially in the early years — by anecdotal accounts of
success provided by the inaugural judges. For example, Judge Russell
61

Id.
Russell, Throughout the Nation, supra note 34, at 130.
63 Baldwin & Brooke, supra note 14, at 1-3 (noting that as of 2016, there were 450
veterans courts with more in planning stages); see also id. at 18 (noting, “there is a
dearth of evaluation research on the efficacy, effectiveness, and even cost of the VTC
concept and its implementation” and veterans courts “do not enjoy their own set of
evidence-based practices”); Jack Tsai, Andrea Finlay, Bessie Flatley, Wesley J. Kasprow
& Sean Clark, A National Study of Veterans Treatment Court Participants: Who Benefits
and Who Recidivates, 45 ADMIN. & POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 236, 237 (2018) (noting, in 2018, that the effectiveness of veterans courts is
“unclear, and comprehensive analyses of . . . outcomes is lacking”).
64 DAVID LUCAS & AARON ARNOLD, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, COURT RESPONSES
TO THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: HAPPENING NOW 1 (2019), https://www.courtinnovation.org/
sites/default/files/media/documents/2019-07/handout_happeningnow_pageview_
07112019.pdf [https://perma.cc/62PR-9KEE].
65 See Andrew Denney, New Bronx Opioid Treatment Court Looks to Help Addicts Kick
Their Addiction, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 29, 2018, 7:14 PM), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/sites/newyorklawjournal/2018/01/29/new-bronx-opioid-treatmentcourt-looks-to-help-addicts-kick-their-addiction/ [https://perma.cc/Z464-FCCV].
66 Gibula, supra note 44.
67 LUCAS & ARNOLD, supra note 64, at 1-5.
62
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reported, a year into his veterans court experiment, that the fifteen court
graduates had a “zero percent recidivism rate.”68 Certainly, this is an
encouraging achievement for those graduates and this observation was
likely instrumental in persuading other jurisdictions to follow Judge
Russell’s lead. However, without more, it proves nothing of the efficacy
of the veterans court approach. The desistance Judge Russell observed
could have been due to the specialized court process; it also could have
been due to a number of other factors — including the (perhaps
inadvertent) cherry-picking of participants who would have desisted
regardless of the specialized court process.69 Absent more information,
including recidivism statistics for a similarly situated comparison
group, it is impossible to know what caused this outcome.70
Any objective data that purports to prove the ameliorative impact of
problem-solving courts has been produced after the courts have
proliferated and become entrenched. And retrospective studies often
reveal that preliminary, court-created reports observing drastic
recidivism are drastically overstated or unfounded.71 Moreover, despite
the fact that the problem-solving court approach has existed for thirty
years, the data leaves much to be desired. Notably, with the exception
of drug courts,72 it is widely accepted that problem-solving courts have
not been analyzed with rigor sufficient to form a conclusion about their
impact.73 Nevertheless, proponents seem to be assuaged that such
courts will be effective, as they are based on the purportedly successful
drug court model.74

68 Russell, A Proactive Approach, supra note 41, at 132. He also noted that 100
defendants had enrolled to date and four had dropped out of the program (two
voluntarily, two involuntarily). Id.
69 See Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 213 (2013)
[hereinafter Against Neorehabilitation] (discussing literature revealing the tendency of
drug courts to “cherry pick” participants).
70 Early, court-published data recounting remarkable success of problem-solving
courts is often later refuted — or at least tempered — by subsequent empirical studies.
See NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 128-31 (providing examples).
71 See id. at 128-130 (providing examples). Levine & Wright recently made a similar
observation in the context of prosecutor-led diversion programs. They found that such
programs lack robust independent empirical support and are instead justified with
technical reports created by program insiders, which “tend to report more cost-savings
and lower rates of recidivism than comparable studies by independent researchers.”
Levine & Wright, supra note 28 (manuscript at 27).
72 NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., supra note 9, at 1 (“More research has been published
on drug courts . . . than virtually all other correctional programs combined.”).
73 See supra note 14.
74 See, e.g., MARLOWE ET AL., supra note 3, at 11-14.
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But the available data on drug courts, while extensive,75 does not
depict an unmitigated success story. While some of the earliest studies
of drug courts demonstrated recidivism reductions among their
participants, it is now widely acknowledged that these studies were
marred by methodological flaws that undermine their findings, such as
small sample size, lack of a meaningful comparison group, and
selection-bias.76 It is only relatively recently — decades into the
problem-solving court movement — that some drug court evaluations
have been conducted with sufficient scientific rigor to enable
assessments of drug court efficacy.
A series of analyses undertaken by the Government Accountability
Office (“GAO”) illustrates the chronological challenges in assessing
drug court efficacy. GAO endeavored to study the impact of federallyfunded drug courts in 1997 and again 2002, only to find that it “could
not draw any firm conclusions,” in large part because the existing
studies were limited or flawed and drug courts were not maintaining
proper follow-up data.77 When it tried again in 2005, it determined 27
of 117 existing drug court evaluations were methodologically sound
and determined, based on these 27 studies, that drug courts “can reduce
recidivism,” at least during the time in which the defendant was under
court supervision.78 And in its 2011 study, it identified only 32 of 260

75 NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., supra note 9, at 1 (“More research has been published
on drug courts . . . than virtually all other correctional programs combined.”).
76 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 14, at 12 (summarizing methodological
flaws and providing citations); Michael Rempel, Mia Green & Dana Kralstein, The
Impact of Adult Drug Courts on Crime and Incarceration: Findings from a Multi-Site QuasiExperimental Design, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 165, 167-68 (2012) (noting that
literature reviews of drug court evaluations conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s
concluded that drug courts reduced recidivism, but “typically qualified their
conclusions by lamenting the poor research designs employed by most studies”).
77 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-434, DRUG COURTS: BETTER DOJ
DATA COLLECTION AND EVALUATION EFFORTS NEEDED TO MEASURE IMPACT OF DRUG COURT
PROGRAMS 2 (2002), https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/234379.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U4YR-2UHF]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-97-106, DRUG COURT:
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, CHARACTERISTICS, AND RESULTS 7-8 (1997), https://www.gao.
gov/assets/160/155969.pdf [https://perma.cc/78AF-2P52].
78 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-219, ADULT DRUG COURTS: EVIDENCE
INDICATES RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS AND MIXED RESULTS FOR OTHER OUTCOMES 2, 7 (2005),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/245452.pdf [https://perma.cc/P46E-4MVL] [hereinafter
GAO-05-219 (2005)]; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-53, ADULT
DRUG COURTS: STUDIES SHOW COURTS REDUCE RECIDIVISM, BUT DOJ COULD ENHANCE
FUTURE
PERFORMANCE
MEASURE
REVISION
EFFORTS
8
(2011),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586793.pdf [https://perma.cc/63ZM-B4WH] [hereinafter
GAO-12-53 (2011)] (summarizing 2005 study).
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available evaluations as sufficiently rigorous to include in its analysis.79
It found that eighteen of these thirty-two studies demonstrated that
drug court participation led to statistically significant recidivism
reductions.80
Thus, the GAO concluded — eventually — that some studies indicate
that drug courts reduce recidivism. Another recent analysis of drug
court evaluations came to similar conclusions, finding “mixed” results
regarding recidivism reductions.81 While most of the evaluations
demonstrated that drug courts reduced recidivism, some indicated drug
court participation either had no impact on recidivism or increased
recidivism.82 The researchers further concluded, based on a review of
meta-analyses of drug courts, that drug courts reduce recidivism by an
average of 10%, which they characterized as “modest.”83
In sum, drug court evaluations seem to demonstrate that some drug
courts modestly reduce recidivism for some individuals, some of the
time.84 And even for those studies that indicate recidivism reductions,
very little is known about which aspects of drug courts lead to these
reductions.85 Moreover, conclusions of efficacy on other metrics —
such as cost-savings or reducing substance use — are even more
tentative.86
The intent of this discussion is not to prove that drug courts do or do
not work. Rather, it is to highlight the ambiguity in the current research
findings as to their impact. Contrary to the prevailing narrative, data
neither justify nor explain the growth of problem-solving courts. If data
are not driving this movement, what is? The following Part offers an
answer.
79

GAO-12-53 (2011), supra note 78, at 5.
Id. at 19.
81 Latessa & Reitler, supra note 15, at 767.
82 Id. at 767, 778.
83 See id. at 779-80.
84 Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts, in 3 ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 28788 (“[T]he quantitative research [on drug courts], warts and all, tells a story of modest
success . . . .”).
85 JOANNE CSETE & DENISE TOMASINI-JOSHI, OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., DRUG COURTS:
EQUIVOCAL EVIDENCE ON A POPULAR INTERVENTION 12 (2015) (“[W]hile there is a great
deal of research on drug courts, very little of it identifies outcomes that can be said to
be the direct result of drug court participation”); see, e.g., GAO-05-219 (2005), supra
note 78, at 7 (noting that the researchers could not determine which aspects of the drug
court program contributed to recidivism reductions).
86 See, e.g., GAO-05-219 (2005), supra note 78, at 25-26 (discussing disparate
findings regarding cost savings of drug courts); Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts, in 3
ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 297 (discussing studies showing that, overall,
drug court participation does not reduce incarceration time).
80
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JUDGING PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS

This Part refocuses and supplements the traditional narrative
regarding the origins and purpose of the problem-solving court
movement. It argues that these courts emerged not only as a response
to systemic dynamics external to the judicial process, but also to
changes to the nature of judging itself, specifically changes to the scope
of judicial authority due to sentencing law reform. In so doing, it
positions the rise of problem-solving courts as a response to judicial
dissatisfaction and as a judicial reclamation of authority and expertise.
Then, drawing on theories of bureaucratic behavior, it identifies
institutional and personal factors that encourage the persistence and
proliferation of these institutions, regardless of whether they advance
the public interest. Finally, it shows that this growth is likely to
continue unabated, despite open questions of their efficacy, as the
judges themselves remain largely in control of their destiny.
A. Reclaiming Courts
As recounted above, the standard narrative portrays problem-solving
courts as a response to systemic problems external to the judicial
process, namely unaddressed social issues and the deleterious effect of
tough on crime policies on court dockets. This traditional account is
not wholly inaccurate, but it is incomplete. It largely overlooks
significant transformations internal to the judicial process that emerged
alongside problem-solving courts.
As problem-solving courts emerged, there was increasingly little for
judges to judge. Over the course of the twentieth century, the
proportion of criminal cases that were disposed of through guilty pleas
instead of trials was gradually increasing.87 By 1971, the Supreme Court
had accepted plea-bargaining as an “essential component of the
administration of justice.”88 Due, at least in part, to the rising number
of prosecutions during the subsequent “tough on crime” era, and
changes to substantive criminal law and sentencing law that enhanced
prosecutorial power, plea-bargaining became even more central to the
functioning of the criminal legal system.89 Currently, more than 97% of
87 See Albert Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5-6
(1979); (noting that plea bargaining had become “common” in the 1920s and
“American criminal courts became even more dependent on the guilty plea” in the
subsequent decades); see also id. at 26-29 (offering statistics).
88 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
89 RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS
INCARCERATION 131 (2019) (noting that the “one-two punch” of the proliferation of
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federal convictions are achieved through a guilty plea. And the
percentage in many states is even higher.90
Unsurprisingly, this shift in the disposition method of criminal cases
shifted the locus of judicial activity. Quite simply, in this system of
pleas, there was less for judges to adjudicate.91 Instead, the focus of
judicial duties shifted to ensuring pleas were constitutionally sound and
then imposing sentence.92
Even in a criminal justice system predominated by pleas, judges retain
a crucial and exclusive power: the power to sentence.93 Yet, in the years
preceding the emergence of the problem-solving court movement, this
core judicial power was diminishing.94 For most of the twentieth
century, judges in state and federal jurisdictions had “nearly unfettered
authority” to determine what sentence to impose upon a criminal
defendant.95 Beginning in the 1970s, however, amidst growing concern

criminal laws and severe sentencing laws “virtually knocked jury trials out of the
system”); see also William Ortman, When Plea Bargaining Became Normal, 100 B.U. L.
REV. 1435, 1435 (2020) (providing a robust account of the rise of plea bargaining); cf.
Darryl K. Brown, How to Make Criminal Trials Disappear Without Pretrial Discovery, 55
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 155, 159 (2018) (contending that the “rising caseload” explanation
for the prevalence of guilty pleas “fail[s] to fully explain the criminal trial’s decline”).
90 See Brown, supra note 89, at 155 n.2 (citing state court statistics).
91 I use the term “adjudicate” in the same manner as Judith Resnik, who defines
“adjudication” as “a dispute resolution process in which judges employed by the
government make decisions based upon information presented by the parties. Judges
decide motions, preside at trials and hearings, and sometimes find facts. When ruling,
judges are obliged to provide reasoned explanations for their decisions, and the parties,
in turn, are obliged to obey.” Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374,
378 n.13 (1982).
92 As King and Wright establish in their recent empirical study, in some
jurisdictions judges are also actively involved in the plea negotiation process. Nancy J.
King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging
and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 326-27, 332 (2016)
(summarizing Albert Alschuler’s 1976 study documenting judicial participation in plea
bargaining).
93 Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 66 (2018) (“The power to
determine the severity of a sentence — to determine how much punishment is due a
particular offender for a particular offense — is a core judicial function.”).
94 King & Wright, supra note 92, at 335-36 (“[O]f all the trends in state criminal
justice since the 1970s, restrictions on the sentencing discretion of judges is one of the
most prominent.”).
95 Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Guidelines, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE 95, 95 (Erik Luna ed., 2017),
https://law.asu.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/academy_for_justice/Reforming-CriminalJustice_Vol_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/RF52-66ST] [hereinafter Sentencing Guidelines]; see
also Ram Subramanian & Ruth Delaney, Playbook for Change? States Reconsider
Mandatory Sentences, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 198, 200 (2014).
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that these discretionary, indeterminate sentencing systems were so
unpredictable and unguided that they were essentially “lawless,” many
jurisdictions reigned in judicial discretion by adopting guidelinesbased, structured sentencing systems.96 Such sentencing regimes
expressly aim to limit judicial discretion by encouraging judges to
impose a sentence within a predetermined range, based on an
assessment of delineated factors. And for the first fifteen years of the
problem-solving court movement, some jurisdictions required judges to
issue a sentence within the guidelines range.97 Meanwhile, federal and
state lawmakers were heeding calls to get tough on crime by
implementing mandatory sentencing statutes, which prohibit judges
from imposing a sentence below the statutory minimum.98 The resultant
transformation of sentencing systems was “remarkable.”99 These
legislative changes altered the nature and impact of sentencing in many
ways, but one change is particularly pertinent to this analysis: authority
over what sentence a defendant received largely shifted to
prosecutors.100
96 Berman, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 95, at 97-99 (noting that “nearly every
state adopted some form of structured sentencing” that responded to concerns of
“lawlessness” in sentencing); see also Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota,
Other States, and the Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 69,
69 (1999) (noting that, as of 1999, seventeen states had adopted a sentencing guidelines
system and at least eight more were considering adopting sentencing guidelines). For
current information regarding state sentencing guidelines and commissions, see Alexis
Lee Watts, Timelines of Sentencing Commissions and Sentencing Guidelines Enactments: 1978
to the Present, SENT’G GUIDELINES RESOURCE CTR. (July 27, 2016), https://sentencing.umn.
edu/content/timelines-sentencing-commissions-and-sentencing-guidelines-enactments1978-present [https://perma.cc/57XA-E5B2].
97 As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakeley v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296 (2004), states could no longer require judges to impose guidelines-based sentences.
98 Berman, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 95, at 99 (noting that “a number” of
states adopted of “mandatory sentencing statutes” in the 1980s and 1990s); see also
Subramanian & Delaney, supra note 95, at 200 (“[G]alvanized by a growing belief that
tougher penalties can reduce crime, mandatory minimum sentences and recidivist
statutes . . . became popular as a means of ensuring that offenders deemed ‘dangerous’
would receive a sufficiently severe custodial sentence.”).
99 Berman, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 95, at 99 (“Though there is
considerable variation in the form and impact of structured sentencing reforms, the
overall transformation of the sentencing enterprise throughout the United States has
been remarkable. The discretionary indeterminate sentencing systems that had been
dominant for nearly a century have been replaced by a wide array of sentencing laws
and structures that govern and control sentencing decision-making.”).
100 Id. at 110-11 (“Scholars have long expressed concerns that structured and
determinate sentencing systems will problematically transfer undo sentencing authority
and discretion from judges to prosecutors . . . .”); Melissa Hamilton, McSentencing: Mass
Federal Sentencing and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2199,
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Thus, around the same time as the problem-solving court model was
emerging, judicial authority over sentencing — the core power allotted
to judges in the plea-dominated system — was diminishing.
Simultaneously, the war-on-drugs was ramping up, but state trial court
judges, who daily witnessed the devastating impacts of these harsh
polices, were relatively powerless to counteract their effect.101 Judges
have reflected that these changes to structured sentencing systems left
them feeling that they were essentially “rubber-stamp bureaucrats” or
“judicial accountants.”102
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the problem-solving court model
emerged and gained popularity as this sense of judicial dissatisfaction
and disempowerment was taking hold.103 Early reflections of drug court
judges indicate that they were attracted to the emerging specialty court
model precisely because of these systemic changes. Many have noted
that they felt frustrated and constrained by mandatory minimum
sentences,104 and that they found the drug court approach “liberating,”
in contrast, because it offered more flexibility in sentencing.105 One
drug court judge in California reflected:
You know, the legislature in the state of California has just
about taken away all the discretion we have as judges. They now
tell us exactly what sentence to impose, and how to do it, and

2233 (2014) (“Many federal criminal law experts have observed that the
implementation of determinate sentencing . . . transfers discretion from judges to
United States Attorneys.”).
101 See Eric Miller, Codependency Courts (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (discussing the impact of the rise in low-level drug prosecutions on judges).
102 See Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 364 (1992); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 23,
at 84 (“The judge who conducts the sentencing is now, by design, little more than the
instrument of a distant bureaucracy.”).
103 See Boldt & Singer, supra note 8, at 88 (“[T]here is good reason to conclude that
the energetic support drug treatment courts have received from judges has a great deal
to do with their frustration over contemporary sentencing policy. Judges see in these
courts an opportunity to redefine their role in response to the diminished judicial
discretion and autonomy brought about by the determinate sentencing movement,
sentencing grids and guidelines, and the straightjacket of mandatory minimum
sentences.”).
104 NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 104 (“The goal of getting the drug
court client well, however, now supersedes the goal of consistency and impartiality, and
even in some cases, as we will see, strict adherence to statutory law. A common
frustration expressed by drug court judges is the unwelcome constraints they
experience from legislatively imposed mandatory minimum sentences.”).
105 Id.
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when to do it, and where to do it. This is one of the few areas
that we have where we still have some discretion.”106
And this claim is further supported by how proponents describe the
problem-solving court movement as a whole. They characterize the
movement as being a “grassroots” effort, not “something where the
bureaucrats in Washington tell you what to do.”107 And it is not just a
bottom-up movement, but specifically a “judge-led movement.”108
Thus, in addition to the many external systemic problems highlighted
in the traditional account, problem-solving courts also emerged to solve
a problem internal to the judicial process itself: a growing sense of
judicial dissatisfaction and disempowerment caused by the rise of
structured and mandatory sentencing schemes.
B. Building a Problem-Solving Court Empire
The foregoing observations start to shed light on the puzzle posed in
Part I: why do problem-solving courts proliferate, despite the
underwhelming empirical support for their efficacy? It suggests that
problem-solving courts emerged to solve a problem with judging.
Building on that observation, this subpart contends that problemsolving courts continue to thrive — regardless of their impact on
recidivism or other metrics of success — because the judges who create
and preside over them have a professional and personal self-interest in
their persistence. In other words, these judges have an interest in
building a problem-solving court empire.
The “empire-building hypothesis,”109 also known as the agency
expansion hypothesis, the “self-aggrandizement hypothesis,”110 and the
“‘imperial model’ of bureaucratic behavior,”111 was developed in
administrative law literature to help explain the behavior of
bureaucrats. As these descriptive titles convey, the theory is quite
simple: it identifies the possibility that self-interested bureaucrats will
seek to expand the realm of their influence in order to maximize their

106

Id. at 105.
Id. at 42 (quoting a drug court judge).
108 Id. (“The Drug Court movement is essentially a judge-led movement.”).
109 Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 915, 924 (2005).
110 Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and
Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1351-52 (2013).
111 Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1292-93 (2006).
107
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power.112 Like all public-choice theories, the empire-building
hypothesis starts from the premise that governmental actors are
primarily self-interested, and that self-interest will lead them to seek to
expand their power and influence.113 In the agency context, the empirebuilding hypothesis posits that administrators will lobby Congress to
increase their budgets and, therefore, the size and influence of their
agencies.114 As a result, bureaucrats will regulate not because such
regulation is necessary, but because it benefits the regulators.
At first blush this theory, which posits that administrators retain
interests separate from that of the agency, may seem inapposite to
judges, who are presumptively neutral actors. Indeed, the presumed
neutrality of judges as compared to bureaucrats led Michael Dorf to
conclude that problem-solving courts should remain in the judiciary,
despite his acknowledgement that these institutions are run “in much
the same manner as parallel administrative agencies,”115 and are
“functionally indistinguishable” from such agencies.116 Dorf defined
neutrality as the “even-hande[d],” non-partisan application of
principles117 and “not having a stake in the outcome” of the
proceedings.118 And on this measure, problem-solving court judges may
in fact be — or be perceived as — neutral.119 While they presumably
want each individual defendant to succeed in the court-mandated
program, we must also presume that they apply the basic tenets of the
problem-solving court model even-handedly and would not sacrifice
these principles to enable a defendant to escape sanction if she has failed
to satisfy the programming requirements. Moreover, whereas the selfinterest that motivates imperialistic bureaucrats is presumably and
112

See Levinson, supra note 109, at 925.
See Benjamin H. Barton, Harry Potter and the Half-Crazed Bureaucracy, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1523, 1530 (2006); see also Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and
the Meaning of the Modern State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out that Baby, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 309, 310 (2002) (describing inherent human self-interest as an
essential component of public choice theory).
114 As Daryl J. Levinson explains, “[t]he size of the budget, the theory goes, might
correlate with a number of things that self-interested bureaucrats value: compensation
and perquisites, future employment prospects, and the ability of the agency to
accomplish policy goals to which the bureaucrat is ideologically committed.” Levinson,
supra note 109, at 932.
115 Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
875, 954 (2003).
116 Id. at 950.
117 See id. at 953.
118 Id.
119 As Dorf explains, “courts are the institutions that connote neutrality,” and this
perception “in large part makes the reality.” Id. at 952.
113
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primarily financial,120 problem-solving court judges — and judges
generally — do not stand to gain financially from their actions or,
specifically, the expanse of the problem-solving court empire.121
However, even if problem-solving court judges are neutral as to the
outcome in an individual case, it does not follow that they are neutral
as to the outcome of the problem-solving court movement. Moreover,
“[t]he absence of a patent economic interest does not mean that judges
are without self-interest.”122 In fact, problem-solving court judges stand
to benefit professionally and personally in many ways from presiding
over these specialized courts. And these benefits may motivate them,
like their bureaucratic counterparts, to expand the problem-solving
court empire, regardless of whether doing so advances the public
interest. As the Director of Standards for National Association of Drug
Court Professionals (“NADCP”) candidly reflected in 2015, “The aim
of the first couple decades of drug courts was to spread drug courts.”123
Based on extensive observational research of and interviews with
problem-solving court judges, sociologist James Nolan noted, “a
discussion with an American problem-solving court judge quickly
reveals a great deal of commitment to and personal investment in these
programs.”124 He characterized the judges as “true believers” who
believe that the problem-solving court movement is of “profound
120 And the strongest critique of this theory is that bureaucrats do not necessarily
stand to benefit financially from the expansion of their agency budget. See Levinson,
supra note 109, at 925. As Levinson points out, bureaucrats may be motivated to expand
their agency for other, non-monetary reasons, including a genuine dedication to the
agency mission. Id.
121 See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 294-95 (1997) (“A judge
cannot increase her salary by doing a better job of judging . . . .”); Frederick
Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68
U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 616 (2000) (“Legislators, executives, and bureaucrats are widely
understood by scholars and by the public to be motivated by various forms of selfinterest, including the desire for re-election, the desire for promotion to higher office,
the desire to expand their base of power, and the desire to maximize future even if not
current income, but the similarly self-interested judge is largely an absent figure in the
academic literature on the judiciary and on judicial decision-making.”).
122 Cross, supra note 121, at 295.
123 Lauren Kirchner, Drug Courts Grow Up, PAC. STANDARD (July 27, 2015),
https://psmag.com/news/drug-courts-grow-up#.8mv8crss3z [https://perma.cc/68NQVWTH] (emphasis added) (quoting Terrence Walton, Director of Standards at NADCP)
(indicating that Walton continued: “We said, ‘We want a drug court in the reach of
every individual in need.’ Well, now that we have almost 3,000 drug courts across the
country and in every single state, we want a drug court that works in reach of everyone
in need”).
124 NOLAN, LEGAL ACCENTS, supra note 49, at 137.
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historical significance.”125 Nolan and others — including commentators
and practitioners who are themselves part of the problem-solving court
movement — have compared the judges’ devotion to the success and
spread of the movement to religious conviction. For example, according
to Nolan, problem-solving court judges “are often proselytizers,
wishing to spread the ‘good news’ of problem-solving courts to their
immediate judicial colleagues and quite literally to the rest of the
world.”126 One judge, who had presided over a drug court, mental
health court, and domestic violence court, described herself to Nolan as
a “disciple” of the movement, adding that “any place that we can expand
it, we should.”127 Greg Berman and John Feinblatt, prominent problemsolving court proponents, have reflected that judges often describe their
introduction to problem-solving courts in terms reminiscent of a
“conversion narrative.”128 Berman and Feinblatt themselves have
encouraged others to “preach to the unconverted,”129 with Berman
adding separately that in order to institutionalize problem-solving
justice, proponents should look for “every possible opportunity —
PSAs, op-eds, public events — to spread the gospel of problem-solving
justice.”130
As suggested above, one reason problem-solving courts emerged was
to address a sense of judicial disempowerment and dissatisfaction in an
era of plea-bargaining and structured sentencing. And on these
measures, if not others,131 it seems this initiative has succeeded.
Problem-solving court judges have immense discretion over how to
manage the cases on their docket. This approach “affords them a great
deal of power and discretion (beyond what they would have in a regular
criminal court).”132 Those who preside over a treatment-oriented court,
for example, can choose from a “myriad” of sanctions for defendants

125

Id.
Id.; see also id. at 139 (quoting an Irish judge who described American problemsolving court judges’ enthusiasm for their courts as “almost evangelical”).
127 Id. at 138.
128 GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, JUDGES AND
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 21-22 (2002), https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/
files/p-s%20court%20primer%20PDF3.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SK6-M9SJ].
129 Id. at 15.
130 GREG BERMAN, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE HARDEST SELL? PROBLEM-SOLVING
JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGES OF STATEWIDE IMPLEMENTATION 5 (2004),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/Hardest%20Sell1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JUK7-QSSV].
131 See supra Introduction (discussing competing statistics).
132 See NOLAN, LEGAL ACCENTS, supra note 49, at 140.
126
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who are straying from their treatment plans,133 and do so “individually
and creatively” because “[o]ften there are no hard and fast rules” about
how they can or must respond.134 One community court judge reflected
that the problem-solving court model has “broadened the judicial
horizon” and “given judges more choices than [they] have ever had.”135
Moreover, and perhaps because these courts return to judges some of
the discretion and authority that diminished as a result of sentencing
reform, problem-solving court judges regularly report higher levels of
job satisfaction than their conventional peers.136 A judge who presided
over both a drug court and conventional criminal court in Roanoke,
Virginia, reflected, “I get more personal satisfaction out of what I’m
doing with the drug court population than with anything I do for the
remainder of the week.”137 A drug court judge from Louisville,
Kentucky, similarly noted that, “When I’m in my regular [conventional]
court it’s more like work. . . . Drug court, I don’t have to do it. I’m there
because I want to do it.”138 These individual reflections are not isolated
experiences. Jeffrey Tauber, a former drug court judge and the founding
president of the NADCP, reflected that he had talked to hundreds of
problem-solving court judges and had “not found a judge yet who has
done this work for a significant period of time who hasn’t said it is the
most satisfying work that he has done in his career as a judge.”139
These anecdotal observations have been substantiated by empirical
data. A study compared the job satisfaction of problem-solving court
judges with conventional judges.140 It found that 96% of problemsolving court judges surveyed felt that their assignment to the problemsolving court positively impacted them all (70%) or some (26%) of the
time.141 In contrast, 81% of traditional judges indicated that their job
impacted them positively, with only 41% saying it was always positive
and 40% saying it was sometimes positive.142 Only 4% of problemsolving court judges — as opposed to 19% of traditional judges — said
133 For example, they can order a short stint in jail, increased attendance at substance
abuse counseling sessions, increased drug testing, and/or community service. See Nolan,
Therapeutic Adjudication, supra note 25, at 36.
134 Id.
135 NOLAN, LEGAL ACCENTS, supra note 49, at 141.
136 Id. at 8-9; see also Chase & Hora, supra note 26, at 209.
137 NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 109 (quoting Judge Diane
Strickland).
138 Id. (quoting Judge Henry Weber).
139 NOLAN, LEGAL ACCENTS, supra note 49, at 138-39 (quoting Judge Jeffrey Tauber).
140 Chase & Hora, supra note 26, at 209.
141 See id. at 227.
142 See id.
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their assignment negatively impacted them.143 Specifically, 85% of the
problem-solving court judges reported that their judicial assignment
had a “positive emotional effect on them,” compared to 58% of other
judges.144
Additional survey findings reveal factors that may explain this
discrepancy in satisfaction. For example, problem-solving court judges
were significantly more likely (83%) than the other judges (68%) to
believe that their courts are actually helpful to the litigants.145 They also
had significantly more positive attitudes towards the litigants (51% as
compared to 15%)146; had more hope that the litigants can solve the
problems that brought them to court (81% as compared to 46%)147; felt
that the litigants who came before them respected them (85% as
compared to 68%)148; and were grateful for them (62% as compared to
27%) more than their conventional counterparts.149
Furthermore, judges, like other types of legal professionals (and
people generally), inevitably care about their professional reputation
and will, at times, seek to enhance or maximize their prestige.150 And
presiding over a problem-solving court can increase a judge’s
notoriety.151 The first judge to create a certain kind of court or to open
a court in a new jurisdiction is often met with abundant praise in the
press and the community.152 He or she is often deemed an expert on the
intricacies and best practices for that model and will regularly travel the

143

Id.
Id. at 228.
145 Id. at 219.
146 Id. at 221.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 224.
149 Id. at 225.
150 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 534 (Aspen Publishers 7th
ed. 2007) (“Like other people, judges derive utility from nonpecuniary goods such as
leisure and prestige, as well as from money.”); Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional
Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts,
Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1195 (2003) (noting that judges “have
a substantial interest in maximizing their own ‘prestige’”).
151 Some commentators have suggested that presiding over a problem-solving court
helps judges distinguish themselves from other judges in ways that help them during
judicial elections. See, e.g., NOLAN, LEGAL ACCENTS, supra note 49, at 143.
152 See BERMAN, Judicial Innovation in Action, supra note 47, at 53 (describing how an
“initial innovation” such as a new problem-solving court “attracts the attention of the
press, elected officials and funders”).
144
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country and even the world reflecting on their experiences and
encouraging other jurisdictions to adopt their court model.153
For example, a British official visited the first drug court in Miami in
1995. Impressed with what he saw, he invited the courts’ inaugural
judge, Stanley Goldstein, to speak at a conference of British police the
next year. Inspired by Judge Goldstein’s “passion and emotion about
how his drug court worked,” additional local British officials visited his
courtroom and, upon returning to England, secured funding for that
country’s first drug court.154 This dynamic also occurs domestically. For
example, Judge Robert Russell’s 2008 speech about his experience
opening the nation’s first veteran’s court is cited as a significant step in
prompting the inaugural veteran’s court in Wisconsin.155
Thus, many judges who preside over problem-solving courts have a
professional self-interest in sustaining and expanding the problemsolving court empire. These personal interests provide an independent
reason, apart from the public interest, that judges may seek to entrench
the problem-solving court model.
Crucially, however, the suggestion is not that problem-solving court
judges are purely or even primarily avaricious and power hungry.
Rather, they draw satisfaction from this position not only because it
affords them more authority and discretion, but also because they
believe that this judicial approach is more effective than the
conventional court system.
C. Enabling Problem-Solving Courts
That judges are deeply invested in the problem-solving court
movement is not, on its own, concerning. It becomes so, however, in
light of this subpart’s insight — that there is no meaningful oversight of
their impact nor restriction on their continued growth. Thus, it seems
the problem-solving court movement will continue to grow unabated,
and irrespective of the public interest.
The traditional court oversight mechanism — the appellate review
process — is inapplicable to problem-solving courts because, quite
simply, they produce no judicial decisions to review. Within these
specialty dockets, judicial actions are purely administrative as opposed
153 See, e.g., NOLAN, LEGAL ACCENTS, supra note 49, at 3 (describing how the first
community court in Red Hook, Brooklyn became “the prototype for the development
of community courts internationally”).
154 Id. at 45.
155 Services for Veterans, WIS. CT. SYS., https://www.wicourts.gov/services/veteran/
index.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/C4UX-C4QC].
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to adjudicative.156 During the “problem-solving” phase of the court
process (i.e., after the defendant has pled guilty and been admitted to
the court),157 there are no facts to adjudicate, laws to apply, or pleabargains to review.158 The sole judicial task is to oversee the
administration of the conditions of sentence.
For these reasons, some have suggested that problem-solving courts
are not actually “courts,” but rather some sort of program or agency.159
In the agency context, scholars have suggested that robust oversight by
an independent body may guard against agencies’ self-aggrandizing
tendencies.160 However, in criminal law, generally, and in the problemsolving court context in particular, there is no such independent
oversight.161
State legislatures may provide a remaining source of potential
oversight. As this subpart demonstrates, however, they do not do so.
Although legislation regarding problem-solving courts is increasingly
common, it largely affirms existing practices. As a result, the judiciary
156 See Dorf, supra note 115, at 940 (noting that problem-solving courts do “very
little judging in the sense of making a non-mechanical decision”).
157 The vast majority of problem-solving courts operate on a post-adjudication
model; to enter these court dockets, the defendant must plead guilty. See CSETE &
TOMASINI-JOSHI, supra note 85, at 2 (noting that 93% of drug courts follow a postadjudication model).
158 See John S. Goldkamp, The Drug Court Response: Issues and Implications for Justice
Change, 63 ALB. L. REV. 923, 952 (2000) (“Generally, adversarial procedures are
employed at the screening and admission stage . . . and at the conclusion of drug court
when participants are terminated and face legal consequences or graduate. During the
drug court process, however, formal adversarial rules generally do not apply.”).
159 For example, in denying a drug court defendant’s claim that he was denied his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he appeared without an attorney at his drug
court termination hearing, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky reasoned that this hearing
was not a “critical stage of the proceedings” because “the ‘Drug Court’ is not a ‘court’ in
the jurisprudence sense; it is a drug treatment program administered by the court system.”
Dunson v. Kentucky, 57 S.W.3d 847, 850 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis added); see
also Dorf, supra note 115, at 876 (describing problem-solving courts as “nominally
judicial bodies that are more akin to decentralized administrative agencies than to
conventional adjudicators”).
160 As Bagley and Revesz explain, “[i]f the [empire building] model is accurate, then
an [Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs] process that puts a thumb on the scale
against regulation might check that behavior and lead to more rational regulation.”
Bagley & Revesz, supra note 111, at 1293; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Criminal Law as
Regulation, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 316, 328-29 (2014) (summarizing argument in favor
of Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) oversight).
161 Barkow, supra note 160, at 328-29 (“There is nothing like OIRA review for
criminal law. Instead the criminal law approach is totally driven by stories without any
kind of analysis of whether, in fact, the benefits of a particular approach outweigh the
costs. There is no check or oversight on these actions.”).
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— and the individual judges themselves — retain authority over
whether to open such a court and how they should operate.
1.

Authorization

For the first decades of the problem-solving court movement, state
legislatures were largely silent regarding problem-solving courts.
Aspiring problem-solving court judges “simply open[ed] shop” as a
function of their inherent authority to control the docket and impose
punishment.162 The earliest problem-solving courts resulted from a
practice of extreme docket management when a judge docketed a
particular type of case — e.g., those involving substance-addicted
defendants, or defendants who are veterans — for a particular day.163
For example, Judge Russell started the first veteran’s court in response
to a suggestion that he “set aside a day for vets that we’re seeing who
have a clinical diagnosis of mental health disease or disorder,
dependency on substances, or both, and set them on a calendar.”164
Some states have begun to fill this legislative vacuum with statutes
that authorize problem-solving courts and define aspirational or
mandatory characteristics of such courts.165 Authorization legislation is
relatively common for drug courts, with approximately 60% of U.S.
states and territories reporting that they have legislation enabling the

162 Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts
and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1500-01, 1500 n.201
(2004) (describing the process of opening a drug court in New York State in 2004); see
Sohil Shah, Authorization Required: Veterans Treatment Courts, the Need for Democratic
Legitimacy, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 81 (2014)
(“In most states, state judiciaries have broad discretion to create specialized dockets and
courts at the trial level. Under this authority, state judiciaries have created numerous
problem-solving courts . . . .”). This “boldness” amongst problem-solving court judges
is seemingly unique to the U.S. context. Problem-solving court judges in other countries
“have tended to rely on and wait for initiation and direction from the other branches of
government.” NOLAN, LEGAL ACCENTS, supra note 49, at 143. Michael Pollack identifies
the judiciary’s establishment of new courts — a function traditionally delegated to the
legislature — as one of the ways state court judges have moved “beyond judging.” See
Pollack, supra note 27 (manuscript at 33-34).
163 See, e.g., Bernard Edelman, VVA & Veterans Treatment Courts, VVA VETERAN ONLINE
(Mar./Apr., 2015), http://vvaveteran.org/35-2/35-2_vetcourts.html [https://perma.cc/76SAXLWA] (explaining the origins of the first Veterans Treatment Court).
164 Id.
165 And in many states, this legislative vacuum still exists for all problem-solving
courts, or particular types of courts. In Kentucky, for example, the judiciary created its
first veterans court in 2012 even though the state legislature has not spoken regarding
the opening of such a court. See Shah, supra note 162, at 91.
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creation of specialty courts.166 It remains relatively rare, but increasingly
common, for states to have similar legislation authorizing other types
of specialty courts.167 These authorization statutes largely codify
existing practices: they simply specify that the judiciary may open a
specialty court.168 In Florida, for example, two localities created

166

MARLOWE ET AL., supra note 3, at 9.
For example, a study conducted by the Tennessee Administrative Office of the
Courts found that the majority of states did not have legislation that addressed veterans
courts. See TENN. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, VETERANS TREATMENT COURTS
LEGISLATIVE REPORT 3-4 (2012), http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/docs/vtc_
report_-_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW4D-UT5X]; see also Benjamin Pomerance, The
Best-Fitting Uniform: Balancing Legislative Standards and Judicial Processes in Veterans
Treatment Courts, 18 WYO. L. REV. 179, 201 (2018). Some states have addressed all
problem-solving courts in a single statute or set of standards. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 2.30.010-.060 (2015) (regarding “therapeutic courts”); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, STATE STANDARDS: BUILDING BETTER MENTAL HEALTH COURTS 2 fig.1 (2015),
https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/spcts/id/301 [https://perma.cc/T92TE2ZN] (identifying states that have adopted standards exclusively for mental health
courts and those that have adopted generic standards that are applicable to mental
health courts). Others have enacted separate legislation or standards for different types
of courts. Many, for example, originally enacted legislation regarding drug courts, and
later followed up with similar legislation for mental health courts and veterans courts.
Arizona, for example, enacted ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3422 (2020), authorizing drug
courts, in 1998. See 1998 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 1960. In 2010, it passed § 22-601 to
authorize the creation of homeless courts, see 2012 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 1005, which it
amended in 2014 to add authorization for veterans courts and mental health courts. See
2014 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 309.
168 The statutes vary as to who within the judicial branch can decide to create a
specialty court. Some states vest the authority in the court of general jurisdiction or the
judges who preside over them. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-3422, 22-601 (2020)
(allowing the presiding judge of the superior court [the trial court of general
jurisdiction] to decide whether to establish a drug court, homeless court, veterans court,
or mental health court); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-1-15(a)(1) (2020) (“Any court that has
jurisdiction over any criminal case” relating to a controlled substance “may establish a
drug court division”); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-101, -102 (2020) (allowing judges who
“exercis[e] criminal jurisdiction” to create a veterans court and specifying that such
courts “shall have the same powers as the court that created it.”). Others grant the power
to create the courts to an individual or court up the hierarchy of judicial authority, such
as the chief judge of the judicial district, or the state’s high court. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-5-144 (2020) (allowing chief judge of a judicial district to establish a
program for veterans); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 4, § 433 (2020) (“The Chief Justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court may establish veterans treatment courts . . . .”); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 471.1 (2020) (“Each district court of this state is authorized to establish
a drug court program . . . .”). Still others vest authority in the office of court
administration or a problem-solving court commission. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78A-5-303 (2020) (“The Judicial Council may create a veterans treatment court . . . .”).
167
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veterans courts, and then the state legislature enacted legislation
authorizing the creation of similar courts throughout the state.169
Thus, whether states have authorizing legislation seems to be of little
import: with or without such statutes, the decision of whether to open
a specialty court is within the discretion of the judiciary.170 Tellingly, a
few states have determined that authorization legislation is
unnecessary, as it grants a power that the judiciary already possesses.171
For example, California’s governor thrice vetoed legislation authorizing
the judiciary to develop veterans courts, reasoning that such legislation
was “not required”172 and that the power granted was “already within
the courts’ authority”173 and fell “logically within the sound discretion
of the courts.”174 And Washington State’s law authorizing the creation
of “therapeutic courts” (which include drug courts, mental health
courts, veterans courts, and gambling courts) specifies that the law is

169 Shah, supra note 162, at 93-94. New York followed a similar path. In 2009, more
than a decade after the first drug court opened in New York, the state legislature passed
Criminal Procedure Law 216, which authorized the established practice of diverting
certain felony offenders into treatment programs. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 216.05 (2009)
(allowing judicial diversion). That same year, the Chief Administrative Judge adopted a
rule permitting the Chief Administrator of the Courts to establish drug courts, and
authorizing the local courts to transfer eligible defendants to the drug court. N.Y. CT.
R. §§ 143.1, 143.3; see John Feinblatt, Greg Berman & Aubrey Foxx, Institutionalizing
Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 283 (2000)
(identifying when New York state opened its first court); see also Casey, supra note 162,
at 1500-01 (noting there was “no enabling legislation or mandate” regarding drug courts
in New York state in 2004).
170 A few states have enacted legislation that seems to require every judicial district
to open a particular type of problem-solving court. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 166/15(a) (2020) (“The Chief Judge of each judicial circuit must establish a drug
court program . . . .”); id. § 167/15 (2020) (“The Chief Judge of each judicial district
shall establish a Veterans and Service members Court program . . . .”). Others have tried
(but failed) to pass such mandatory legislation. See, e.g., H.B. 2234, 53d Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2018) (stalled in committee) (proposing section 12-137, which would say:
“The presiding judge of the superior court in each county shall establish a veterans
court” and “shall establish the eligibility criteria for referral to veterans court”); see
Pomerance, supra note 167, at 219. The California legislature considered legislation that
would “require superior courts to develop and implement veterans courts” in 2015, but
that legislation apparently was stalled in committee. A.B. 983, 2015-2016 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2015) (emphasis added).
171 See MARLOWE ET AL., supra note 3, at 55 (“[M]any states with thriving drug court
operations have not seen a need to pass legislation specifically authorizing drug
courts.”).
172 A.B. 1925, 2009-2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (stating Governor Schwarzenegger’s
veto).
173 A.B. 201, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (stating Governor Brown’s veto).
174 A.B. 2611, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (stating Governor Brown’s veto).
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unnecessary, as the judiciary has the “inherent authority” to establish
such courts.175 Nevertheless, the legislature enacted the statute to
encourage the judiciary to create therapeutic courts.176
2.

Affirmation

In addition to authorizing legislation, some states have also adopted
statutes that identify certain processes or “key components” that
problem-solving courts should or must adopt.177 The “key components”
such statutes reference were originally created in 1996 for drug courts
after a small group of drug court practitioners convened to identify a set
of guiding principles based on their “instincts, personal observations,
and professional experiences” in drug courts.178 These components
were adopted by the NADCP the following year, and soon became the
national standard for drug court operation.179 They have since been
adapted for other types of problem-solving courts, including mental
health courts, veterans courts, and DUI (driving under the influence)
courts.180
The components offer overarching principles about how the courts
should function. They identify broad mandates about what the courts

175

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2.30.010-.060 (2020) (regarding “therapeutic courts”).
Id. § 2.30.010(3).
177 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-23A-4(f) (2020) (“Drug courts shall include all of the
following ten key components . . . .”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-10-139(c)(3) (2020)
(establishing “an evaluation process that ensures that any new and existing specialty
court program that is a drug court meets standards for drug court operation under [the
NADCP ten key components]”); FLA. STAT. § 397.334(4) (2020) (requiring that drug
courts follow the NADCP ten key components); N.H. REV. STAT. § 490-G:2 (2020)
(defining a drug court as “a judicial intervention process that incorporates and
substantially complies with the Ten Key Components . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-6103 (2020) (“All veterans treatment court programs in this state shall be established
and operated according to the following ten (10) key components as adopted by the
National Clearinghouse for Veterans Treatment Courts at the National Association of
Drug Court Professionals: . . . .”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-5-303 (2020) (listing criteria
for veterans courts).
178 NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., supra note 9, at 2.
179 See id.
180 Id. (noting that the Ten Key Components of drug courts provided the framework
for other courts); see, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR DWI COURTS, THE TEN GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF
DWI COURTS, https://www.dwicourts.org/wp-content/uploads/Guiding_Principles_of_
DWI_Court_0.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2020) [https://perma.cc/A7A7-YQK4] (adopting
the Ten Key Components into DWI courts); The Ten Key Components of Veterans
Treatment Court, JUST. FOR VETS (Mar. 20, 2017), https://justiceforvets.org/resource/tenkey-components-of-veterans-treatment-courts/ [https://perma.cc/NEZ6-9TA8] (adopting
the Ten Key Components into Veterans Treatment Courts).
176
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should do (integrate drug treatment services, identify eligible
participants early, provide access to a continuum of services and
coordinate strategies, monitor abstinence through drug testing) and
how the institutional actors should behave (the parties should use a
non-adversarial approach, judges should interact with defendants, the
court should monitor and evaluate program goals and forge
partnerships with community organizations, all staff should continue
education).181
Generally, it seems courts adhere to these general components.182
They are, after all, a codification of the methods that judges had
developed and have been attempting to follow for decades. But one of
these components remains elusive: data collection and reporting.183 A
nationwide evaluation of fourteen drug courts believed to be “typical of
drug treatment court programs across the country,” found that the
courts largely adhered to the key components — with the exception of
the monitoring and evaluation component.184 This component was
“clearly not implemented to the degree of other key elements.”185 Many
of the locations, for example, did not have a centralized management
information system in place to capture information about the court
participants, process, and outcomes.186 Even Illinois, which required
181 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS,
at iii (1997, reprinted 2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/205621.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WPC7-8U3L].
182 See Susan Turner, Douglas Longshore, Suzanne Wenzel, Elizabeth Deschenes,
Peter Greenwood, Terry Fain, Adele Harrell, Andrew Morral, Faye Taxman, Martin
Iguchi, Judith Greene & Duane McBride, A Decade of Drug Treatment Court Research,
37 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 1489, 1504-05 (2002).
183 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 181, at 17-20 (“Monitoring and
evaluation measure the achievement of program goals and gauge effectiveness.”);
Pomerance, supra note 167, at 191 (“In a number of jurisdictions, Veterans Treatment
Courts are not required to develop reliable methods of monitoring court activities,
collect relevant data, or report this data in a publicly accessible format.”).
184 Turner et al., supra note 182, at 1504-05.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 1509, 1513-14; see also Fred L. Cheesman II, Dawn Marie Rubio & Richard
Van Duizend, Developing Statewide Performance Measures for Drug Courts, NAT’L CTR.
FOR ST. CTS. STATEWIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULL., Oct. 2004, at 1, 3,
https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ctadmin/id/970/ [https://perma.cc/
6SRX-E7Q3] (“Emerging drug courts tend to focus, by necessity, on operational issues,
often at the expense of developing and implementing an evaluation plan and despite the
recommendation that evaluation planning should be one of the initial activities of
establishing a drug court (see Key Component #8). As a consequence, evaluation
planning often tends to take place long after the drug court was implemented and many
opportunities to identify control groups and collect data have passed.” (citation
omitted)).
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every judicial district to open a veterans court as of January 2018, does
not require these courts to regularly collect or report data about their
performance.187
Thus, there is a relatively nascent legislative trend towards expressly
authorizing the creation of problem-solving courts and a concomitant
effort to standardize their operation. However, the courts remain largely
immune to meaningful objective oversight or regulation in one key and
seemingly crucial area: efficacy. Some states have adopted legislation
that requires the collection and reporting of certain information about
specialty court performance, including the number of court
participants, participant “outcomes,” and recommendations for the
future.188 But even those states that legislatively require such reporting
often vest reporting responsibility in the judicial branch itself189 and do
not identify what “outcomes” should be measured, let alone how they
should be defined.190 Nor do they require that the courts achieve certain
metrics. Thus, despite this recent legislative attention to problemsolving courts, state judiciaries — and local courts themselves — still
retain great discretion over whether to start a problem-solving court and
how to administer it.191
187 See Adams et al., supra note 40, at 10 (noting that “effective data collection” has
been missing “from every Illinois [veterans court]”).
188 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-5-303(5) (2020) (requiring Veterans Treatment
Courts to provide a written report on data, outcomes, and recommendations); see also
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1210 (2020) (requiring Veterans Treatment Courts to collect
data “on each individual applicant and participant and the entire program”); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-254.2(A) (2020) (requiring each specialty docket to submit “evaluative
reports” to the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court, and requiring
that Office to submit a “report of such evaluations” annually).
189 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-254.1(E) (2020) (“Administrative oversight for
implementation of the Drug Treatment Court Act shall be conducted by the Supreme
Court of Virginia.”).
190 One exception is Michigan, which codified a definition of “recidivism” in 2017.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 761.1(s) (2020).
191 Interestingly, there is one area of problem-solving court practice that most state
legislatures have not hesitated to mandate: eligibility criteria for court participants.
Many states restrict participation in specialty courts to defendants who are not presently
or have not been previously convicted of an offense involving violence or who have a
relatively limited criminal history. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5604(2) (2020) (“No
person shall be eligible to participate in drug court if . . . [t]he person is currently
charged with, has pled or has been adjudicated or found guilty of, a felony crime of
violence or a felony crime in which the person used either a firearm or a deadly weapon
or instrument . . . [or] a sex offense.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-22-113(1) (2020) (“Each
participant in a drug court treatment program shall . . . [n]ot be a violent offender . . .
.”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-15-6 (2020)(a) (“A drug offender shall not be eligible for
the drug court program if . . . [t]he underlying offense [or a previous conviction]
involves a felony crime of violence . . . [or] an offense that requires registration as a sex
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III. QUESTIONING PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
The observations made above may seem inconsequential at first
blush: regardless of their efficacy, if the courts increase judicial job
satisfaction, perhaps there is no cause for concern. This Part contends,
however, that the continued and unchecked growth of the problemsolving court model it troubling, for at least two reasons. First, the lack
of oversight, combined with the deep judicial investment, has allowed
the courts to become largely self-reinforcing institutions. Second, it
creates resistance to further reform in at least two ways. It can create
resistance to new — or newly nuanced — understandings of issues like
substance addiction and mental illness and their relationship to the
criminal legal system. Moreover, judicial investment in problem-solving
courts can create resistance to other measures that share the reformist
aims of problem-solving courts. Ultimately, these observations call into
question whether the problem-solving court model should persist.
A. Confirming Courts
The deep judicial commitment to the problem-solving court model
provides fertile ground for the influence of confirmation bias, which is
the “seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to
existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.”192 It is a largely
implicit, unconscious bias that “refers usually to unwitting selectivity
in the acquisition and use of evidence.”193 It causes people to seek
evidence that supports their position and avoid or discount that which
does not.194 Moreover, confirmation bias can influence how people
interpret evidence. For example, it can lead them to “see in data the
patterns for which they are looking, regardless of whether the patterns
are really there.”195
One form of confirmation bias is belief persistence, which occurs
when one forms a belief and then resists changing that belief, even when
confronted with compelling evidence that their belief is wrong.196 This
offender . . . .”). Even Washington state, which specifies that the therapeutic court judge
retains the discretion to determine eligibility criteria, specifies that certain classes of
individuals are ineligible for specialty court participation (absent special findings). See
WASH. REV. CODE § 2.30.030(2)-(3) (2020).
192 Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
193 Id.
194 Id. at 177-78.
195 Id. at 181.
196 Id. at 187. This phenomenon is also called belief perseverance. See Barbara
O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay between Institutional
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belief becomes self-reinforcing in two ways. First, it shapes how people
interpret new evidence. People are likely to believe evidence that
supports their belief, skeptical of evidence that challenges it, and tend
to interpret ambiguous evidence in a way that supports their belief.197
Second, the belief influences what new information people seek: they
tend to search for and focus on information that supports their belief
and disregard or downplay that which challenges their belief. Both of
these dynamics — the selective invocation of evidence that supports the
problem-solving court model, and the dismissal of that which does not
— are present amongst problem-solving court judges and practitioners.
1.

Shaping Success

Despite the diversity of problem-solving court forms, most are united
in a universal claim: they reduce recidivism. This claim should serve as
a somewhat objective check on court performance: do the courts
actually reduce recidivism? Part I demonstrates that, on a national scale,
the answer as to drug courts seems to be that they sometimes reduce
recidivism, albeit at “modest” levels, and remains unanswered as to
other types of courts. This section explores how, on a more granular
scale courts can shape this malleable metric of success and selectively
interpret studies to cast their accomplishments in the most favorable
light.198
Recidivism is generally defined as the “repeated commission of
criminal behavior after one has been adjudged a criminal or
delinquent.”199 Although this is a straightforward concept, it can be
measured in a number of different ways, ranging from arrest, to official
charging, to conviction.200 There are many drawbacks to using arrest to
measure recidivism. Most obviously, of course, is that the fact that an
arrest does not establish that criminal activity actually took place.201
Thus, it is overinclusive: it captures contact with police that may be
unfounded or that will not lead to formal charging, let alone an official
Incentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999,
1011-12 (2009).
197 O’Brien, supra note 196, at 1011-12.
198 See id.
199 CARY HECK, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., LOCAL DRUG COURT RESEARCH: NAVIGATING
PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND PROCESS EVALUATIONS 3 (2006), https://www.ndci.org/wpcontent/uploads/Mono6.LocalResearch.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZX7U-Y9SK].
200 Id. (“Various studies have used measures ranging from bookings to full
convictions . . . .”); see Turner et al., supra note 182, at 1510.
201 See generally Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987 (2019)
(identifying and critiquing the use of arrest as a metric of recidivism).
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finding that the individual committed a crime. Yet, despite this obvious
conceptual shortcoming, re-arrest is commonly used to measure
recidivism,202 in large part, because it is easy to document.203
Interestingly, many states use convictions instead of re-arrest to
measure recidivism when assessing problem-solving courts.204 Using
this metric undoubtedly decreases estimates of the overall recidivism. It
excludes those cases that are ultimately dismissed as well as those that
are still pending when the drug court treatment program concludes.
And when this traditional metric — regardless of how it is defined —
does not support the efficacy story, proponents may invoke other
measures to prove their point. A recent evaluation of felony drug courts
in Idaho, published by the Idaho Judicial Branch, is illustrative. It
acknowledges that recidivism was “the primary outcome of interest” in
the evaluation.205 And on this measure, drug courts fell short; the
202 Nora V. Demleitner, How to Change the Philosophy and Practice of Probation and
Supervised Release: Data Analytics, Cost Control, Focus on Reentry, and a Clear Mission,
28 FED. SENT’G REP. 231, 236 (2016) (“Many U.S. recidivism data sets are based on rearrest rather than reconviction.”).
203 HECK, supra note 199, at 10.
204 For example, a survey conducted by the National Center for State Courts found
that four of nine states surveyed used conviction as the exclusive measure of recidivism,
and one more used both arrest and conviction. See 6 DAWN MARIE RUBIO, FRED
CHEESMAN & WILLIAM FEDERSPIEL, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, PERFORMANCE
MEASUREMENT OF DRUG COURTS: THE STATE OF THE ART 9 tbl.2 (2008),
https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/spcts/id/171/ [https://perma.cc/HBM6CVSJ]. The survey is not exhaustive; at least two states not included in this survey also
use conviction. See, e.g., FRED L. CHEESMAN, II, NICOLE L. WATERS, SCOTT E. GRAVES,
KATHRYN J. GENTHON & ADRIENNE M. TATEM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MARYLAND
ADULT DRUG COURT PERFORMANCE MEASURES 51 (2017), https://mdcourts.gov/sites/
default/files/import/opsc/dtc/pdfs/evaluationsreports/mdadultdrugperformance2017.pd
f [https://perma.cc/TTK4-PS25] (defining recidivism as a new case filing during the
reporting period that resulted in a conviction); JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO MENTAL HEALTH COURTS EVALUATION REPORT, at iii (2019),
https://isc.idaho.gov/psc/reports/2019-MHC-Evaluation-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D6W2-T37Q ] (defining post-program recidivism for mental health court evaluation as
a new case filing that resulted in conviction). And although Michigan codified a
definition of recidivism in 2017 as “any rearrest, reconviction, or reincarceration . . . for
a felony or misdemeanor offense or a probation or parole violation,” MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 761.1(s) (2020), its annual Problem Solving Court report for fiscal year 2019
nevertheless only accounts for new convictions when describing outcomes for its drug
and sobriety courts. See MICH. SUPREME COURT, FY 2019 PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
ANNUAL REPORT 15-16 (2019), https://courts.michigan.gov/Administration/SCAO/
Resources/Documents/Publications/Reports/PSCAnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YE9F-FDSN] [hereinafter FY 2019 REPORT].
205 ROBERT OWENS, JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, FELONY DRUG COURTS
EVALUATION REPORT 8 (2014), https://isc.idaho.gov/psc/reports/Id_Felony_DC_Eval_
Report_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/569E-RC76].
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evaluation found that there was no statistically significant difference in
recidivism between drug court participants and the comparison
group.206 Nevertheless, the evaluation does not conclude that the drug
courts do not work.207 Rather, it then states that recidivism is an
incomplete metric, as it “does not account for some offenders who had
undesirable outcomes,” such as those who were incarcerated based on
a probation revocation.208 And when these “undesirable outcomes” are
accounted for, drug courts become a success. The evaluation found that
drug court participants had “the lowest rate of undesirable outcomes”
amongst the groups that were studied.209
In addition to selectively choosing metrics, problem-solving court
practitioners also selectively invoke empirical findings to support their
success narrative. The website of the NADCP illustrates this
phenomenon. NADCP is the “premier training, membership, and
advocacy organization for the treatment court model,” and overseen by
a Board of Directors comprised primarily of state court judges.210 It was
created in 1994 after a meeting of judges and other professionals
working in the twelve drug courts that were then in existence.211 This
organization exercises great influence over the practices and attitudes
of problem-solving court judges.212 One researcher concluded, based on
interviews, that the judges “appear to respect and trust the NADCP”
more than they respect and trust statements and guidance from the
federal government.213 She opined that this respect was because judges
are the “primary members” of NADCP.214
NADCP proudly declares on its website that treatment courts “save
considerable money for taxpayers,” and specifies that the courts
“produce benefits of $6,208 per participant, returning up to $27 for
206

Id. at 9 fig. C2.
Indeed, doing so would call into question the state’s statutory declaration that
drug courts are effective. See MARLOWE ET AL., supra note 3, at 14.
208 OWENS, supra note 205, at v.
209 Id.
210 Board of Directors, NAT’L ASS’N DRUG CT. PROFESSIONALS, https://www.nadcp.org/
about/board-of-directors/ (last visited July 7, 2019) [https://perma.cc/6U63-DCPE].
211 Richard S. Gebelein, Reflections from a Retired Drug Court Judge: What We Have
Learned About Drug Treatment Courts in the Past 25 Years, DEL. LAW., Spring 2017, at 8, 9.
212 Barbara Andraka-Christou, What Is “Treatment” for Opioid Addiction in ProblemSolving Courts? A Study of 20 Indiana Drug and Veterans Courts, 13 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
189, 248-49 (2017) (explaining that most survey respondents said that their practices
were heavily influenced by information they received at the annual NADCP
conference).
213 Id. at 251.
214 Id.
207
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every $1 invested.”215 In support of this claim, the website links to the
National Institution of Justice’s 2011 Multi-Site Adult Drug Court
Evaluation (“MADCE”).216 The study did find that the “net benefit of
drug courts is an average of $5,680 to $6,208 per participant, returning
$2 for every $1 of cost.”217 Crucially, however, the MADCE researchers
specify, “these findings are not statistically significant.”218 Yet, NADCP
fails to mention this qualification of the research findings, as well as the
researchers’ ultimate conclusion that, while drug courts reduce “costly
criminal offending,” the courts are “also expensive enough to offset
those costs.”219 The MADCE researchers explain that drug courts are
more costly than traditional courts, but they “do not appear to have
much of an effect on resources in two areas where big benefits are
possible — improved labor market participation and health.”220
Nor does the NADCP highlight other less favorable findings of the
MADCE study, such as the researchers’ conclusions that “it now appears
doubtful that drug courts produce a consistent reduction in
incarceration” on the case that led to the individual’s participation in

215 Treatment
Courts Work, NAT’L ASS’N. DRUG CT. PROFESSIONALS,
https://www.nadcp.org/treatment-courts-work/ (last visited June 18, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/7QY5-NW76].
216 See SHELLI B. ROSSMAN, MICHAEL REMPEL, JOHN K. ROMAN, JANINE M. ZWEIG,
CHRISTINE H. LINDQUIST, MIA GREEN, P. MITCHELL DOWNEY, JENNIFER YAHNER, AVINASH S.
BHATI & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., THE MULTI-SITE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION: THE
IMPACT OF DRUG COURTS, VOLUME 4 (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/237112.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YKE-R6VM].
217 Id. at 6. This number reflects the researchers’ estimation of “a single individual’s
total impact on society.” They concluded that “the average drug court participant still
does more harm to society than benefit,” but drug court participation lowers the harm
by “between $5,600 and $6,200 per participant.” Id. at 247.
218 Id. at 6.
219 Id. at 247. The Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs also misleadingly
characterized the MADCE findings, claiming that “drug courts saved an average of
$5,680 to $6,208 per offender overall,” but without noting this finding was statistically
insignificant. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DRUG COURTS 1
(2020),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/238527.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NA6H7PPU]. And a report published by the National Drug Court Institute (which is a division
of the NADCP) similarly presents empirical findings in a misleading way. It reports —
correctly — that the GAO’s 2011 study assessed evaluations of thirty-two drug courts,
and that this study found that drug courts reduce recidivism by 6-26%. MARLOWE ET
AL., supra note 3, at 16. It omits, however, that the GAO determined that these
recidivism reductions were statistically significant in only eighteen of these studies.
GAO-12-53 (2011), supra note 78, at 19. The NDCI’s presentation of this material leaves
the impression that the GAO determined thirty-two studies, as opposed to eighteen,
found that drug court participation caused the recidivism reductions.
220 ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 216, at 247.
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drug court.221 While drug court participation reduced or eliminated the
length of incarceration for those who graduated from the program for
the precipitating case, those who failed out of the program faced
dramatically higher sentences.222 Graduates averaged 24.5 days of
incarceration as compared to an average of 272.6 for those who failed
the program.223 In a separately published summary of their findings, the
researchers explained, “drug courts do not appear to operate as a reliable
‘alternative to incarceration’ on the precipitating case.”224
This example is not offered to suggest that NADCP intends to mislead
its audience about the MADCE study. The point, rather, is that this
organization of drug court judges and other drug court professionals
emphasize only the parts of the study that support their worldview —
that problem-solving courts work, full stop — and disregard the rest.
2.

Excusing Failures

While problem-solving court proponents tend to ignore studies that
undermine the success narrative, they do, from time to time,
acknowledge — and then dismiss — the findings of such studies. They
do so in a few different ways. One dismissal strategy is to excuse the
failures of unsuccessful courts as aberrational and the product of
ineffective individuals — not the model itself. For example, Greg
Berman, a leader in the problem-solving court movement, has dismissed
empirical critiques of the problem-solving court model as a product of
the “shoddy practice effect.”225 He claims that “some of the concerns
raised by critics of problem-solving courts are a response to the failings
of individual judges, attorneys, and courtrooms rather than an
indictment of anything intrinsic to problem-solving courts.”226
At the same time, problem-solving court practitioners may invoke
their personal experience and observations to suggest that quantitative
studies — the very studies many invoke to support the success narrative
— cannot possibly capture the successful impact of the problem-solving
221

Id. at 80.
Id.
223 Id. at 70. In a separately published summary of the study findings researchers
explained that, “[i]n short, drug courts provide a clear alternative to incarceration for
those who graduate; but the consequences of failing are much more severe than in the
absence of a drug court.” Rempel et al., supra note 76, at 181.
224 Rempel et al., supra note 76, at 190.
225 BERMAN, Judicial Innovation in Action, supra note 47, at 63 (“[A]ny effort to
separate the wheat from the chaff with problem-solving courts must take into account
what might be called the ‘shoddy practice effect.’”).
226 Id. at 63-64.
222
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court method. Drug court professionals have said, for example, that
quantitative studies cannot “convey the ‘ups and downs,’ ‘zigzags,’ and
other kinds of ‘real-life’ behavior actually involved in the treatment
progress.”227
In order to compensate for the purported shortcomings of
quantitative studies, problem-solving court judges often focus on
qualitative accounts of success. Thus, it is typical for drug court
evaluations to include and emphasize individual success stories.228
These individual narratives of success have become central to judges’
defense of the court model.229
This focus on individual successes enables judges to continue to
believe that their court works, even if studies suggest other courts are
falling short. And it makes it difficult to criticize the problem-solving
court endeavor; if these courts positively change the lives of some
people, how could they be wrong?
What gets lost in this qualitative justification of problem-solving
courts, however, is that the success stories are themselves rather
exceptional. In many states, only approximately 50% of people who
leave a problem-solving court program do so because they have
successfully completed the program.230 The remaining half are
discharged either because they failed to complete the program
requirements or voluntarily decide to leave.231 And those who fail out
of the programs tend to fare much worse than they would have in the

227 NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 127 (quoting drug court personnel
from Goldkamp & Weiland study).
228 See id. at 127-28; see, e.g., MICH. SUPREME COURT, FY 2019 REPORT, supra note 204,
at 3 (recounting stories of court graduates).
229 NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 128 (noting that narrative-based
criteria “are the typical justifications offered by judge and other drug court officials in
defending the movement”); see also Eric J. Miller, The Punishment and Treatment Is the
Process, JOTWELL (Sept. 18, 2019) (reviewing Wendy Bach, Prosecuting Poverty,
Criminalizing Care, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 809 (2019)), https://crim.jotwell.com/thepunishment-and-treatment-is-the-process/ [https://perma.cc/95TN-TA6H] (describing
how problem-solving court judges emphasize individual success stories to “redirect the
concept of evidence-based outcomes”).
230 See, e.g., CHEESMAN ET AL., supra note 204, at 78 (indicating 47% completion rate
for Maryland drug court participants); OWENS, supra note 205, at vi (reporting that 51%
of felony drug court offenders graduated); MICH. SUPREME COURT, FY 2018 PROBLEMSOLVING COURTS ANNUAL REPORT 11 (2018) (reporting that, in fiscal year 2018, 47% of
all the people who left adult drug court successfully completed the program).
231 See OWENS, supra note 205, at vi.
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traditional court system.232 Thus, qualitative accounts of individual
successes tell only part of the story: court participation works for those
who are successful in the program. They miss that for many, court
participation leads to unchanged, or even worse, outcomes.233
B. Resisting Reform
Problem-solving court judges’ deep commitment to this reform
mechanism encourages them to see what they want to see: that these
courts work. This subpart contends that this tunnel vision has
consequences: it creates resistance to information that casts doubt on
the courts’ foundational premises and to newer reform proposals, even
those that share the goals of problem-solving courts.
1.

Institutionalizing Assumptions

Problem-solving courts do not make law; the vast majority follow a
post-adjudication model, which requires defendants to plead guilty
before they can participate in the specialty court process. However, the
courts do create and circulate assumptions about the nature of certain
social issues and the proper response. These assumptions are often
drawn directly from the judge’s own observations and intuitions, and
become codified in court process and procedure. Because the problemsolving court judge’s expertise and authority are central to creating and
sustaining the jurisdictional space the courts occupy, judges may be
hesitant to adapt and expand their knowledge about the topic, or accept
that perhaps the courts are not succeeding. As a result of this dynamic,
problem-solving courts may institutionalize a static notion of the nature
of the “problem” to be solved and the most effective way to respond to
that problem that may be outdated (because it reflects an articulation of
the problem as it was understood when a court first emerged), or
misguided (because it comports with a judge’s personal opinion, but not
necessarily social science).
For example, mental health courts are based on two foundational
premises: first, that the defendant’s underlying mental health condition
causes criminal behavior and, second, that treating this underlying

232 Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts, in 3 ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 287
(quoting King and Pasquarella as saying some studies suggest that time spent in
treatment had little if any effect on recidivism for dropouts).
233 See id.; see also E. Lea Johnston & Conor P. Flynn, Mental Health Courts and
Sentencing Disparities, 62 VILL. L. REV. 685, 693 (2017).

2021]

The Problem of Problem-Solving Courts

1617

condition will prevent future criminal behavior.234 These assumptions
are widespread, shared by some advocates for people who live with
mental illness,235 and they may even make sense as a matter of gut-level
intuition. They are not, however, supported by contemporary social
science research.236
People with mental health conditions, like people generally, commit
criminal offenses for a range of reasons.237 Research demonstrates that
the criminal behavior of a small class of individuals with mental illness
stems directly from their disorder.238 Much more frequently, however,
it is due to other factors that also influence the criminal offending
behavior of the general population, like poverty.239 Moreover, because
the relationship between mental illness and criminal behavior is not
causal, simply treating mental illness is unlikely to prevent future
criminal behavior.240 One study even declared that there was “no

234 Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts, in 3 ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 28889; see also Johnston, supra note 39, at 547 (“[M]ental health courts appear to embrace
a therapeutic or medical model of rehabilitation, where criminal behavior is viewed as
symptomatic of offenders’ mental illnesses and mental health treatment is believed
necessary to reduce future offending.”).
235 Johnston, supra note 39, at 552-53 (“Even some advocates of individuals with
mental illnesses have assumed that the crimes committed by these individuals often
stem from their disability.”).
236 Id. at 528 (“[T]he weight of recent scientific evidence demonstrates that mental
illness is not a direct contributor to recidivism for most offenders with mental illnesses.
Instead, such offenders often simply exhibit the same risk factors — such as substance
abuse, family problems, and antisocial tendencies — as other offenders.”); see also Boldt,
Problem-Solving Courts, in 3 ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 288-90 (discussing
research illuminating problems with the first and second premises of mental health
courts, namely that there is a direct causal relationship between mental illness and
criminal conduct and that effective treatment of mental illness is likely to prevent future
criminality).
237 Johnston, supra note 39, at 553 (describing research finding that “individuals
with mental illnesses, like the general offender population, have varying motivations for
committing crimes”).
238 One study, for example, found that approximately 8% of 113 arrestees with
mental illness had been arrested for offenses that were “probably to definitely caused”
by their psychiatric symptoms. Jennifer L. Skeem, Sarah Manchak & Jillian K.
Peterson, Correctional Policy for Offenders with Mental Illness: Creating a New Paradigm
for Recidivism Reduction, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 110, 118 (2011) (discussing study).
239 Johnston, supra note 39, at 558-61 (summarizing research).
240 See Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts, in 3 ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, supra note 14, at
290; Johnston, supra note 39, at 573-74.
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evidence” that controlling or treating symptoms of mental illness
reduced recidivism.241
Thus, the foundational assumptions upon which the mental health
court empire has been constructed seem to be “illusory.”242 Similarly,
the veterans court model is based on a number of assumptions that have
not been carefully scrutinized, let alone tested.243 Nevertheless, both
mental health courts and veterans courts continue to proliferate and
thus circulate ideas about the nature of the “problem” to be solved that
reflects intuitive observation, but is not borne out by research.
Problem-solving courts may similarly resist updating assumptions
about the best solution to these problems. For example, drug court
programs advance an abstinence-based model of recovery244 and many
courts center treatment plans on counseling and twelve-step
programs.245 This response method may reflect the sentiment about best
practices in substance addiction treatment that prevailed when drug
courts first emerged. The weight of authority, however, now strongly
supports a harm-reduction treatment model that allows for, among
other things, medication-assisted treatment (“MAT”).246 MAT involves
the use of medications to treat substance use disorders.247 The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, American Medical
Association, and World Health Organization have all concluded MAT is
the “most effective” treatment for opioid addiction when combined with
counseling.”248
241 Skeem et al., supra note 238, at 114 (“[T]here is no evidence for the current
model’s implied link between symptom control or reduction and reduced recidivism.”);
see also Johnston, supra note 39, at 558-61 (discussing research).
242 Johnston, supra note 39, at 561.
243 Baldwin & Brooke, supra note 14, at 4-12. The assumptions Baldwin & Brooke
identify include that there is a link between military service and crime, that traditional
court systems are not equipped to deal with military combat and trauma, that veterans
are a class, and that veterans deserve special treatment. Id.
244 Key Component #5 of the NADCP’s Ten Key Components of drug courts is:
“Abstinence is monitored by frequent alcohol and other drug testing.” BUREAU OF
JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 181, at 11.
245 See Andraka-Christou, supra note 212, at 192.
246 See id. at 219. Meanwhile, the efficacy of self-help twelve-step programs like
Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) or Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”), “the most common
form of treatment in the U.S.,” and a common feature of drug court programming, is
suspect. Id. at 214. Moreover, some AA and NA groups discourage individuals from
participating in MAT. Id. at 215-16.
247 MAT Medications, Counseling, and Related Conditions, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assistedtreatment/treatment (last visited Jul. 2, 2019) [https://perma.cc/5964-HW85].
248 Andraka-Christou, supra note 212, at 219 (providing citations).
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Nevertheless, and despite decades of research highlighting the
efficacy of MAT, many U.S. drug courts have resisted this treatment
method.249 A nationwide survey of drug courts in 2013 found that
nearly half (44%) of all respondents did not permit any form of MAT
for court participants.250 Some respondents indicated they did not
provide MAT because it was not available or was cost prohibitive.251 A
sizeable percentage, however, refused to allow agonist MAT
medications252 due to “negative attitudes” or “incorrect information,”
including opposition from the judge, prosecutor, or local government,
because it was the court’s policy to not allow it, and because it was not
believed to be beneficial to the drug court participant.253 Some
respondents specified that they believed drug court participants would
abuse MAT or that MAT would simply replace addiction to one
substance with another substance.254 The attitudinal resistance to MAT
highlighted in this study has been reflected in recent journalistic
interviews with drug court judges. In 2014, a drug court judge in
Nassau County, New York, defended his policy against methadone and
suboxone, even after a court participant died of a heroin overdose after
the judge ordered him to quit his methadone treatment.255 The judge
described methadone and suboxone as “crutches” and “substitutes for
drugs and drug cravings” that constitute another addiction.256 And more
249 James L. Nolan, Jr., Harm Reduction and the American Difference: Drug Treatment
and Problem-Solving Courts in Comparative Perspective, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y,
31, 41 (2010). Many drug courts in other countries, by contrast, have incorporated
harm-reduction approaches. Id. at 31.
250 See Harlan Matusow, Samuel L. Dickman, Josiah D. Rich, Chunki Fong, Dora M.
Dumont, Carolyn Hardin, Douglas Marlowe & Andrew Rosenblum, Medication Assisted
Treatment in US Drug Courts: Results from a Nationwide Survey of Availability, Barriers
and Attitudes, 44 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 473, 476 (2013) (finding that 56% of
the drug courts that responded to their survey “reported at least some of their opioid
dependent participants were receiving some type of MAT”). The researchers caution
that these results may not be generalizable because of a 50% response rate and 46%
completion rate. Id. at 479. As of 2015, problem-solving courts that prohibit MAT are
not eligible for federal funding. Andraka-Christou, supra note 212, at 242.
251 Matusow et al., supra note 250, at 477.
252 Agonist medications prevent opioid withdrawal, but do not block the euphoric
effect of narcotic substances. Methadone and buprenorphine are FDA-approved agonist
medications. See MAT Medications, Counseling, and Related Conditions, supra note 247.
253 Matusow et al., supra note 250, at 477 tbl.5.
254 Id. at 478.
255 See Ann Givens & Chris Glorioso, Father Faults Judge for Son’s Heroin Overdose,
NBC N.Y. (Aug. 29, 2014), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/MethadoneJudge-Rule-Father-Blame-Lepolszki-Son-Overdose-Heroin-Addict-Ruling-I-TeamInvestigation-273213211.html [https://perma.cc/MMG6-KYRM].
256 Id.
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recently a drug court judge in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,
explained that he does not allow MAT for his drug court defendants
because he believes it is “just another addiction.”257 He claimed it
“doesn’t solve the problem,” adding “I just don’t know if there’s another
answer except abstinence.”258
Thus, while drug courts purport to be “evidence based,” many fail to
embrace current medical research about best practices for responding
to substance abuse. And even those courts that do allow MAT may
administer it in a way that contradicts this same research. A recent
survey of Indiana drug court and veteran’s court judges, for example,
found that while many judges allow some form of MAT, some impose
short and arbitrary time limits on its use despite medical literature that
demonstrates it is most effective for longer-term use.259 And a common
reason for not allowing agonist MAT in another study was that the drug
court participants had detoxed before they were admitted to the court
program; however, this policy is also contrary to medical best
practices.260
These errors in the articulation of the problem and solution become
institutionalized in the court practices. And they become further
entrenched as other jurisdictions rush to adopt a new court form, often
before any actual research has been done to refine or test the court’s
foundational assumptions.261
2.

Opposing Alternatives

Many judges and other practitioners herald problem-solving courts
not only as an effective reform measure, but as the “universal remedy to
society’s pressing social difficulties.”262 Both neutral and invested
organizational actors circulate this image of problem-solving courts as
a “revolutionary panacea.”263 For example, in 2000 and again in 2009,
257 Rich Lord, Drug Courts Divided on Approaches to Addiction Recovery, PITT. POSTGAZETTE (May 14, 2018, 3:30 AM), https://www.post-gazette.com/news/health/2018/05/
14/Drug-courts-divided-addiction-medications-Narcotics-Anonymous-Allegheny-County/
stories/201805140003 [https://perma.cc/4XDV-DUN4].
258 Id. A recent survey in Indiana revealed similar beliefs amongst some problemsolving court judges. See Andraka-Christou, supra note 212, at 237 (discussing
responses of some judges that “abstinence while on MAT is not ‘complete’ sobriety”).
259 See Andraka-Christou, supra note 212, at 248.
260 See Matusow et al., supra note 250, at 478-79.
261 See supra Part II.B.
262 See NOLAN, LEGAL ACCENTS, supra note 49, at 126 (characterizing the attitude of
U.S. problem-solving court practitioners, based on interviews and observations).
263 Id.
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the Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court
Administrators passed joint resolutions suggesting “that drug courts
and other problem-solving courts are the most effective strategy we have
for reducing drug abuse, preventing crime, and restoring families.”264
The website of the NADCP similarly declares that treatment courts are
“the single most successful intervention in our nation’s history for
leading people living with substance use and mental health disorders
out of the judges system and into lives of recovery and stability.”265
Unsurprisingly, the NADCP’s associated organizations, the National
Center for DWI (driving while impaired) Courts and Justice For Vets,
make similarly unqualified assertions about the unparalleled success of
this reform.266
This belief that problem-solving courts are the most effective reform
strategy is problematic not only because it is inaccurate,267 but also
because it can create active resistance to alternative reforms.268 For
example, in 2000 California adopted ballot initiative Proposition 36,
which required eligible individuals convicted of nonviolent drug
possession offenses be sentenced to probation and community-based
264

NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., supra note 9, at xiii (summarizing resolutions).
Treatment Courts Work, supra note 215.
266 See
NAT’L CTR. FOR DWI COURTS, DWI Courts Save Lives,
https://www.dwicourts.org/https://www.dwicourts.org/ (last visited July 2, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/YVK6-T8XX] (“DWI Courts are the most successful strategy for
holding repeat impaired drivers accountable while ensuring they receive life-saving
treatment.”); What Is a Veteran’s Treatment Court?, JUST. FOR VETS,
https://justiceforvets.org/whats-at-stake/https://justiceforvets.org/whats-at-stake/ (last
visited July 2, 2019) [https://perma.cc/6U8T-H5BA] (describing veterans courts as “the
most innovative solution for veterans caught up in the criminal justice system”).
267 See, e.g., Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts, in 3 ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, supra note 14,
at 288 (discussing Drug Policy Alliance study finding that drug court reduced
recidivism 8.7%, which was “on par with reduction recorded by programs offering
community-based drug treatment (8.3%)” and less than half of the 18% reduction for
probation supervised treatment programs. And neither of the other alternatives used
incarceration as a sanction). Some problem-solving court proponents have hesitantly
acknowledged that there are more effective alternatives. For example, after declaring
drug courts “work” and “provide substantial savings to offenders, victims, and
taxpayers,” Edward J. Latessa & Angela K. Reitler note, “While adult drug courts appear
to reduce recidivism and save taxpayers money, the effects are modest and fall below what
we see with other correctional programs that adhere to the principles of effective
intervention.” Latessa & Reitler, supra note 15, at 787 (emphasis added).
268 See KAYE, supra note 6, at 218 (“[D]rug courts have the potential to direct
attention away from other approaches that better address issues of both racialized mass
incarceration and drug misuse, siphoning off energies for criminal justice reform into
programs that in fact deepen race- and class- based inequalities.”). See generally Collins,
Status Courts, supra note 1, at 1508 (characterizing problem-solving courts as “release
valve reforms” that decrease pressure for systemic reform).
265
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drug treatment instead of incarceration.269 This proposition was “largely
informed by community experiences with drug courts”270 and embraced
a core drug court tenet: that people convicted of low-level drug-related
offenses should be met with treatment in lieu of incarceration.
Proposition 36, like the drug court model, recognized that recovery is
often a non-linear process. Therefore, it entitled individuals up to three
chances to successfully complete treatment before they are
incarcerated.271 Nevertheless, the NADCP opposed Proposition 36.272
Drug court advocates were concerned that Proposition 36 would
diminish the power of drug courts by removing the ability of judges to
incarcerate defendants who do not comply with treatment.273
These concerns have not been borne out. Nearly twenty years after
Proposition 36 was adopted, drug courts continue to thrive in
California.274 And Proposition 36 defendants and drug court defendants

269 See Lisa Rettig Ryan, Rehabilitation or Decriminalization of Drug Offenses in
California?, CAL. INITIATIVE REV. 1 (2000), https://www.mcgeorge.edu/publications/
california-initiative-review/initiatives-prior-to-november-2005/2000-november-initiatives/
proposition-36 [https://perma.cc/WXZ7-NE54]; see also NOLAN, LEGAL Accents, supra
note 49, at 126.
270 Elizabeth Evans, M. Douglas Anglin, Darren Urada & Joy Yang, Promising
Practices for Delivery of Court-Supervised Substance Abuse Treatment: Perspectives from
Six High-Performing California Counties Operating Proposition 36, 34 EVALUATION &
PROGRAM PLAN. 124, 125 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC3025310/ [https://perma.cc/6W6M-K4Q2].
271 See id. In drug courts, by contrast, the decision of whether or when to incarcerate
a defendant is matter of judicial discretion, a discretion that can be exercised at any
time. See Elizabeth Evans, Libo Li, Darren Urada & M. Douglas Anglin, Comparative
Effectiveness of California’s Proposition 36 and Drug Court Programs Before and After
Propensity Score Matching, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 909, 913-14 (2014) [hereinafter
Comparative Effectiveness].
272 See KAYE, supra note 6, at 45 n.4 (discussing NADCP opposition to Proposition
36); NOLAN, LEGAL ACCENTS, supra note 49, at 126; Ryan, supra note 269, at 12
(discussing NADCP opposition to Proposition 36).
273 See Ryan, supra note 269, at 12 (describing NADCP objections to Proposition 36);
Jessie Seyfer, U.S. Drug Czar Says State Initiative Would Weaken Drug Courts’ Power;
McCaffrey Says Law Would Take Away Ability to Punish, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 3,
2000, at A-3 (describing speech of drug czar Barry McCaffrey to NADCP); Martin Sheen,
Prop. 36 Would Devastate the Drug Court System, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2000, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-aug-07-me-201-story.html [https://perma.
cc/TBC2-DLCQ] (arguing that Proposition 36 will have a “devastating impact” on drug
courts by removing drug testing requirements and the ability for the court to hold offenders
accountable for failing treatment).
274 There were 101 drug courts in California in 2000. See Seyfer, supra note 273. By
2009, there were more than 200. See MARLOWE ET AL., supra note 3, at 37 fig.3; see also
Evans et al., Comparative Effectiveness, supra note 271, at 911 (identifying more than
150 operational drug courts in California).
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have succeeded at similar rates on most measures.275 Nevertheless, drug
court proponents repeated many of the same concerns when California
considered Proposition 5 in 2008, the Nonviolent Offender
Rehabilitation Act (“NORA”), which would have reduced penalties for
certain drug offenses, and again in 2014 when the state considered and
adopted Proposition 47.276 Proposition 47 was crafted as part of the
state’s ongoing effort to reduce prison overcrowding. It reclassified
certain drug possession offenses from felonies to misdemeanors, which
reduced the sentencing exposure of eligible offenders from a year or
more in state prison to up to a year in county jail.277 The NADCP
“strongly oppose[d]” the measure, because it “removes the legal
incentive” for offenders to seek treatment.278 A San Diego drug court
judge recently reflected that Proposition 47 “really hurt our numbers”
and removed the “hammer to threaten (drug users) with
incarceration.”279 Under Proposition 47, some defendants will face a jail
sentence of a few months, which the judge opined, they “can do . . .
standing on their heads” and therefore would choose jail over drug
court.280
This resistance to drug sentencing reform is not limited to California.
In 2018, Ohio voters considered (and ultimately rejected) Issue One,
which would have reclassified certain nonviolent drug offenses from
felonies to misdemeanors, and also would have prohibited jail time for
these offenses under certain circumstances.281 The Issue’s supporters
had said it would “save tax dollars spent on imprisoning some drug

275 See Evans et al., Comparative Effectiveness, supra note 271, at 925-26 (describing
comparative findings after propensity sore matching).
276 See KAYE, supra note 6, at 45 (discussing opposition).
277 See CAL. ATTORNEY GEN., PROPOSITION 47 OFFICIAL TITLE AND SUMMARY: CRIMINAL
SENTENCE. MISDEMEANOR PENALTIES. INITIATIVE STATUTE. 34, 34-35 (2014),
https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/proposition-47-title-summary-analysis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/393X-P9K7] (describing Proposition 47).
278 NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF’LS, STATEMENT IN OPPOSITION OF CALIFORNIA’S
PROPOSITION 47 BALLOT MEASURE 1 (2014).
279 Pauline Repard, Drug Court Participation Drops Four Years After Proposition 47
Reduced Many Drug Crimes to Misdemeanors, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 15, 2018,
5:00 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/sd-me-prop47-courts20180614-story.html [https://perma.cc/WNR8-HG37] (quoting drug court judge Peter
Gallagher).
280 See id.
281 See Katie Wendell, Voters Reject Issue 1, Which Would Keep Low-Level Drug
Offenders Out of Prison, WRAL.COM (Nov. 7, 2018, 2:42 PM EST),
https://www.wral.com/voters-reject-issue-1-which-would-keep-low-level-drug-offendersout-of-prison/17977241/ [https://perma.cc/2Y4V-KB22].
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offenders and encourage rehabilitation of addicts.”282 Many Ohio judges
publicly opposed the measure based on concerns about its impact on
drug courts.283 Ohio Supreme Court Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor
claimed it would “decimate” the drug court process by precluding
judges from using “the proven incentive of jail” to “encourag[e]”
addicts to participate in drug treatment, and even cautioned that people
would die if the measure passed.284 Ohio Supreme Court Justice Sharon
Kennedy encouraged voters to vote “no” on the measure because “an
addict’s involvement in the criminal-justice system — with freedom on
the line — can present a meaningful opportunity for recovery through
Ohio’s drug treatment courts.”285 One drug court judge expressed
“relief” when the measure failed.286 Some Ohio judges, including Chief
Justice O’Connor, have renewed their opposition to a pending
sentencing reform proposal that would reclassify certain low-level drug

282 Mike Gauntner, Mahoning Drug Court Judge Relieved Over Failure of Ohio Issue
One, WFMJ.COM (Nov. 6, 2018, 9:46 PM EST), http://www.wfmj.com/story/39432064/
mahoning-drug-court-judge-relieved-over-failure-of-ohio-issue-one [https://perma.cc/
B32F-X6G6].
283 See, e.g., id. (describing concerns of drug court judge John Durkin); Karen Kasler,
Chief Justice Worries Issue 1 Will Take Away Drug Court Option, Overload Court System,
STATEHOUSE NEWS BUREAU (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.statenews.org/post/chiefjustice-worries-issue-1-will-take-away-drug-court-option-overload-court-system
[https://perma.cc/6R3Q-H9KX] (describing concerns of Ohio Supreme Court Chief
Justice Maureen O’Connor); Maureen O’Connor, Ohio’s Fight Against Drug Abuse Is
Saving Lives — If Issue 1 Passes, More Ohioans Will Die: Maureen O’Connor (Opinion),
CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.cleveland.com/opinion/2018/10/
no_on_issue_1_ohio_is_well_eng.html [https://perma.cc/CFR5-UTLZ] [hereinafter
Ohio’s Fight] (describing concerns of Ohio Supreme Court Chief Justice Maureen
O’Connor); Jim Provance, Former Drug Court Judge Changes Mind, Opposes Issue 1,
TOLEDO BLADE (Sept. 12, 2018, 2:01 PM), https://www.toledoblade.com/news/politics/
2018/09/12/Former-drug-court-judge-changes-mind-opposes-Issue-1-Ohio/stories/
20180912148 [https://perma.cc/Z8EE-FG75] (describing concerns of drug court judge
Scott VanDerKarr); Marty Schladen, Critics: Well-Meaning Issue 1 Would Handcuff Those
Trying to Help Addicts, RECORD-COURIER (Sept. 28, 2018, 12:01 AM),
https://www.record-courier.com/article/20180928/news/309289861 [https://perma.cc/
7MH5-L2FQ] (describing concerns of drug court judge Stephen McIntosh).
284 O’Connor, Ohio’s Fight, supra note 283; see also Maureen O’Connor, Guest
Column: Issue 1 Would Make Ohio a Haven for Drug Dealers, FREMONT NEWS MESSENGER
(Aug. 31, 2018, 11:06 AM EST), https://www.thenews-messenger.com/story/
opinion/2018/08/31/chief-justice-maureen-oconnor-issue-1-would-catastrophic-ohio/
1147149002/ [https://perma.cc/7BRD-Z66G]) (predicting Issue 1 would “have a
devastating consequence on our drug courts”).
285 Sharon Kennedy, Opinion, Vote ‘No’ on State Issue 1 to Preserve Drug Courts,
VINDICATOR (Oct. 14, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://vindyarchives.com/news/2018/oct/14/
vote-no-on-state-issue—to-preserve-drug/ [https://perma.cc/EWN5-MTRJ].
286 See Gauntner, supra note 282.
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possession felonies as misdemeanors because defendants “will not take
misdemeanors seriously in drug court.”287
On a more systemic level, the deep judicial investment in this
institutional response helps perpetuate the notion that the criminal
legal system — and particularly the courts — are the best and most
appropriate mechanism for responding to complicated social and
structural issues. The creation of a new court for every newly discovered
(or newly acknowledged) issue that overlaps with the criminal legal
system has been normalized as a natural and effective response. With
each iteration of this story of court creation and success, it becomes
easier to forget that the decision to respond through the criminal legal
system (as opposed to, for example, the public health system) to issues
such as substance abuse and mental illness, is in fact a choice.288 And it
is a choice that ultimately strengthens, rather than reduces or
dismantles, the tie between these social issues and the criminal legal
system.289
The relatively new Cambridge Homeless Court illustrates this
dynamic. The story starts like most: a few years ago, Massachusetts
District Court First Justice Roanne Sragow noticed a problem: when the
court moved a few miles from Cambridge to Medford, homeless
defendants “couldn’t get there. It was ridiculous.”290 And those who
287 Laura Hancock, Ohio Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor Touts Work to Reform
Criminal Justice, CLEVELAND.COM (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.cleveland.com/open/
2019/09/ohio-chief-justice-maureen-oconnor-touts-work-to-reform-criminal-justice.
html [https://perma.cc/3LC2-93ZV]; see also Eric Boehm, Why Is the Chief Justice of
Ohio’s Supreme Court Lobbying Against Sentencing Reforms?, REASON (Dec. 23, 2019, 1:40
PM), https://reason.com/2019/12/23/why-is-the-chief-justice-of-ohios-supreme-courtlobbying-against-sentencing-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/5GEU-RRNT] (noting that the
legislation has been delayed until 2020).
288 Or, as Richard Boldt, applying the pragmatist theory of the “micro-politics of
trouble” describes, the initial choice of the judge as the “troubleshooter” has shaped
how the problem — or “trouble” — has been defined, and how the solution has been
crafted. See Richard C. Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts and Pragmatism, 73 MD. L. REV.
1120, 1168-72 (2014).
289 See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Amy J. Cohen & Kate Mogulescu, Penal Welfare and the
New Human Trafficking Intervention Courts, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1333, 1337 (2016)
(describing how human trafficking intervention courts advance “penal welfare,” which
is the “practice of providing social benefits through criminal court”); Lustbader, supra
note 43 (“[I]f [a judge who founded a human trafficking court] is correct that sex
workers are ‘not criminals’ and should not be treated as such, why should they be in a
criminal court, facing criminal charges, in the first place?”).
290 Isaiah Thompson, Justice Wears a Different Style at the Cambridge Homeless Court,
WGBH NEWS (June 13, 2019), https://www.wgbh.org/news/local-news/2019/06/13/
justice-wears-a-different-style-at-cambridge-homeless-court [https://perma.cc/QF8M3C4F].
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could make it to court soon became stuck in a “revolving door” to the
criminal justice system: “They’d come into court, it’s a fineable offense,
they can’t pay a fine, they’d dismiss the offense, they’d be arrested a
week later, we’d see them back.”291 So Justice Sragow fashioned a
solution: hold a Homeless Court one day a month at a location in
Cambridge.292 At these court sessions, homeless defendants with
pending cases and open warrants appear and are often ordered to
complete treatment, job training, or both. If they complete the program,
their cases are “dismissed or terminated.”293
Note, however, that the crimes that typically bring these homeless
defendants into court are low-level offenses294 that are often tied to their
houseless status.295 For example, various news accounts describe
individuals who appeared in Homeless Court with cases for trespassing
(for using a bathroom of a commercial establishment without
purchasing anything),296 stealing food from a grocery store,297 breaking
and entering a motor vehicle,298 and drinking in public.299 Homeless
Court, like other problem-solving courts, has been celebrated for
providing an alternative to business as usual, for rendering “justice
laced with compassion.”300
Certainly, the Cambridge Homeless Court and others like it are one
alternative to the traditional criminalization of poverty and
homelessness. But there are other approaches, including completely
cutting the tie between conditions of poverty and the criminal legal
system, and directing resources towards preventative measures that
291

Id.
This Homeless Court is the second in Massachusetts. The other is in Boston. See
PINE ST. INN, HOMELESS COURT PROGRAM: A WAY FORWARD (2016), https://www.mass.
gov/files/documents/2016/08/pq/homeless-court-brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG6K3WKP].
293 Homeless Court, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/service-details/homeless-court
(last visited June 19, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9C8W-ZYSN].
294 Only defendants with charges or warrants for misdemeanor or nonviolent
felonies are eligible to participate in Homeless Court. See PINE ST. INN, supra note 292.
295 See Thompson, supra note 290.
296 See id.
297 See Thomas Farragher, In Cambridge, Mercy and Justice for the Homeless, BOS.
GLOBE (Sept. 20, 2016, 3:52 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/09/20/
cambridge-mercy-and-justice-for-homeless/K85wyudElozgzVNhUi4tAO/story.html
[https://perma.cc/E7V5-EWF6].
298 See Ema R. Schumer, In Cambridge Homeless Court, Another Chance, HARV.
CRIMSON (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/3/15/cambridgehomeless-court/ [https://perma.cc/PGH4-9WVV].
299 See id.
300 See Farragher, supra note 297.
292
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support people before they enter the criminal legal system. The
Sequential Intercept Model (“SIM”) provides guidance. It is a
framework that identifies a series of points at which communities can
intervene to prevent individuals with mental and substance use
disorders from entering or remaining in the criminal legal system.301
The model maps six interception points ranging from Intercept 0 — the
provision of community services to support people in crisis
independent of the criminal legal system — to the Intercept 5 — the
provision of community correctional services after an individual is
released from incarceration.302 A foundational principle of this model is
that interception should occur at the earliest stage possible.303 While
problem-solving courts appear on the sequential intercept model, it is
not until the fourth stage, Intercept 3, at which point the individual is
deeply enmeshed in the criminal legal process.304
Instead of dedicating resources to create a new court that makes it
easier for houseless individuals to appear and adjudicate the charges
against them, as did Cambridge, the sequential intercept model shows
that jurisdictions could focus on providing supportive services and
opportunities that would preclude criminal legal system involvement
entirely. Indeed, two prominent sequential intercept researchers early
on identified an accessible and robust mental health system, one that
provides individuals with services, housing, and treatment, and
operates independently of the criminal legal system, as “the ultimate
intercept” for avoiding the criminalization of individuals with mental
illness.305 This approach, which identifies opportunities to support
people in need instead of funneling them into the criminal legal system,
resonates with the recent robust calls emanating from the protests

301 See POLICY RESEARCH ASSOCS., THE SEQUENTIAL INTERCEPT MODEL: ADVANCING
COMMUNITY-BASED SOLUTIONS FOR JUSTICE-INVOLVED PEOPLE WITH MENTAL AND
SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS, https://www.prainc.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PRASIM-Letter-Paper-2018.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2020) [https://perma.cc/U5NE-5RCQ];
Mark R. Munetz & Patricia A. Griffin, Use of the Sequential Intercept Model as an
Approach to Decriminalization of People with Serious Mental Illness, 57 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 544, 544 (2006).
302 See POLICY RESEARCH ASSOCS., supra note 301; Dan Abreu, Travis W. Parker,
Chanson D. Noether, Henry J. Steadman & Brian Case, Revising the Paradigm for Jail
Diversion for People with Mental and Substance Use Disorders: Intercept 0, 35 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 380, 382-84 (2017) (describing the interception points). Intercept 0 was added to
the model in 2017. See id. at 381.
303 See Munetz & Griffin, supra note 301, at 544.
304 See POLICY RESEARCH ASSOCS., supra note 301.
305 See Munetz & Griffin, supra note 301, at 545.
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against police violence to defund police and invest in alternatives to law
enforcement.
Problem-solving courts are out of step with these popular calls to
rethink and transform the system. Indeed, at their core, problemsolving courts hold fast to the message that “justice” means continuing
to enforce the criminal laws as usual and threatening (if not imposing)
incarceration.306 Problem-solving courts are not, as judges often assure
skeptics, “get out of jail free” programs.307 The courts, rather, are just a
different delivery system for this message about the primacy of carceral
punishment. Indeed, prevailing problem-solving court models require
the existence of a sentence of incarceration as a backdrop to their
operation, as an ever-looking threat that judges can strategically invoke
to encourage compliance with court programs.308 And for that reason,
amongst many others, problem-solving courts will remain a systemic
reform that does not reform the system. For these reasons, and many
others,309 we should question their future.
306 See Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts, in 3 ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, supra note 14, at
295 (noting that the “very design” of problem-solving courts “tends to reinforce the
primacy of the criminal justice components over the therapeutic/healing elements”); see
also KAYE, supra note 6, at 216 (“As a strategy of reform, drug courts leave much of the
existing criminal justice system intact, including ongoing police intervention . . .
lengthy sentences for nonviolent crimes, and a control-oriented prison system with few
services.”).
307 See, e.g., NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 53 (quoting former drug
court judge and NADCP board member Claire McCaskill, “It is tough. It is tougher than
the alternatives”); Repard, supra note 279 (quoting drug court judge Peter Gallagher,
“People call it ‘happy-clappy court’ and ‘kum ba ya court,’ . . . People think it’s a getout-of-jail card. But people find it harder than jail”). And on this measure, if not others,
I agree with problem-solving court proponents. Studies suggest that court participation
does not decrease the likelihood a defendant will be incarcerated. See Johnston &
Flynn, supra note 233, at 693.
308 See KAYE, supra note 6, at 217 (“The entire therapeutic technique of the [drug]
court relies on the threat of punishment . . . Rather than critiquing the warehouse
prison, the drug court . . . model attempts to deploy the prison to greater effect, giving
persons with low-level crimes a taste of the maltreatment they will receive if they do
not adopt the personal practices that the court . . . deem necessary.”).
309 For other critiques of the problem-solving court model, see, for example, Collins,
Status Courts, supra note 1, at 1508-13 (arguing that problem-solving courts may
“disincentivize long-term, systemic reform”); Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, supra
note 69, at 208-10 (identifying drug courts as “the most obvious example of the
neorehabilitative model in the context of sentencing policy reform” and offering a
critique); Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting
Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1591 (2012) (arguing that “specialized criminal
courts threaten to produce a range of unintended and undesirable outcomes:
unnecessarily expanding criminal surveillance, diminishing procedural protections,
and potentially even increasing incarceration”). See generally Scott-Hayward, supra note
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CONCLUSION
Problem-solving courts solve a problem. But the problem they solve
has more to do with disaffected judges than the issues for which they
are named. This insight helps explain their otherwise perplexing
persistence, raises new questions, and uncovers new problems. But it
also enables a conversation about what is really driving one of the most
celebrated developments in modern criminal justice reform: judicial
dissatisfaction and disempowerment. Instead of dealing with the
symptom by creating new courts, we should focus on the cause. Perhaps
it is time to find ways to allow judges to judge again.

12, at 80-87 (summarizing scholarly critiques); Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on
Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 73-75 (2001) (developing procedural critique).

